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REGULATORY REFORM: ASSESSING THE
CALIFORNIA PLAN
MARSHA N. COHEN*
Calfornia enacted an extensive regulatory review plan in 1979
which established the criteria of necesity, authority, clarity, consis-
tency, and reference for all existing andfuture regulations. It created
the office of Administrative Law (OAL) in the executive branch to en-
force compliance with the new standards, and adoptedprocedural modi-
fications to the state's rulemaking scheme. In this article, Professor
Cohen analyzes the Calfornia plan and its application during the first
two years of the OAL's existence. She concludes that the procedural
reforms are generally sound, although in some aspects impose excessive
controls on agencies. In contrast shefnds troubling the plan's controls
on the substantive aspects of regulatory adoptions. The ill-def ned ne-
cessity criterion encourages OAL to substitute its judgment for that of
the agencies' in direct contravention of legislative mandate, and inade-
quately recognizes the contribution of agency expertise to sound regula-
tory policymaking.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Both major political parties have endorsed regulatory reform' on
the federal2 as well as state3 levels. California recently implemented an
1. This Article uses the word "reform" to mean a change in the status quo. Promoters of a
reform usually intend to improve the status quo; use of the word does not, however, mean that the
author endorses each change.
2. Both the Democrats and the Republicans endorsed regulatory reform in their 1976 and
1980 party platforms. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 1980, at B4, col. 1 (Democratic Platform of 1980);
N.Y. Times, July 13, 1980, at 14, coL I (Republican Platform of 1980); N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1976,
at 17, coL 1 (Republican Platform of 1976); N.Y. Times, June 18, 1976, at A12, col. I (Democratic
Platform of 1976).
The Regulatory Reform Act, S. 1080,97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), (S. 1080), which was passed
unanimously by the Senate, 128 CONG. REc. S2713 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1982) [hereinafter cited as
S. 1080], proposed reforms similar to those enacted in California. See, e.g., infra notes 26 & 27. S.
1080 died, but an identical bill-also called S. 1080-has been introduced in the 98th Congress,
see S. 1080, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), 129 CONG. REc. S4908, S4909 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1983).
General descriptions of other federal initiatives include Alviani, Federal Regulatiorn The New
Regimen, 9 BRIT. CoLuM. E/vTrL AFF. 285 (1980); Bliss, Regulatory Refornv Toward More gal-
ancedandFlexibleFederalAgencyRegulation, 8 PEPPEmDiNE L. REV. 619 (1981); Pierce and Sha-
piro, Political and Judicial Review of Agency Action, 59 TEx. L. REv. 1175 (1981); Rosenberg,
Beyond The LImits of Executive Power: Preidential Control ofAgency Rulemaking Under Execu.
tive Order 12,291, 80 MICH. L. REV. 193 (1981).
[Vol. 1983:231
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executive branch mechanism to satisfy the widely perceived need for
regulatory reform.4 Several states and foreign countries have proposed
3. See M. HERNANDEZ, REVIEW OF ADMINIsTRATIVE REGULATIONS: THE EXPERIENCE OF
OTHE STATES, THE FEDERAL GovERMN T, AND OPTIONs FOR CALIFORNIA 13, and app. 2-5, 6
(Assembly Office of Research [California], June 1979); Babbitt, The "State"of Regulatory Reform,
REo., Sept.-Oct. 1980, at 38; Larsen, Legislative Delegation and Oversight: A Promising Approach
From Oregon, 14 WILLAMETTE LJ. 1 (1977). As of 1978, 34 state legislatures, two governors, and
several attorneys general had authority to review regulations, M. HERNANDEZ, supra, at 7.
The revised Model State Administrative Procedure Act, published in 1981 by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, incorporates many features of regulatory
reforms adopted in various states. See generally Bonfield, An Introduction to the 1981 Model State
Administrative Procedure Act, Part P General Provisions, Access to Agency Law and Policy,
Rudemaking, and Review of Rules, 34 AD. L. REv.1 (1982).
4. "Regulatory reform" has several different meanings and may be achieved in many differ-
ent ways. See Bliss, supra note 2, at 621-22; DeMuth, The W te House Review Programs, REo.,
Jan.-Feb. 1980, at 13; Karmel, Appendix B, Regulatory Reform Efforts of the SEC Panel P A Fresh
Look at Federal Regulatory Strategies, 32 AD. L. REv. 165, 206 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Panel
1]; Note, Delegation and Regulatory Reform Letting the President Change the Rules, 89 YALE LJ.
561, 561 (1980).
In one sense regulatory reform responds to the costs of direct government spending programs
and business regulation. Proponents of regulatory reform of this type favor limiting government
intervention in the marketplace. See, eg., Paul, Is a Regulatory Revolt Next? NATION'S Bus., Oct.
1978, at 28; The Regulation Mess, NEWSWEEK, June 12, 1978, at 86; Weidenbaum, Regulation or
Over-Regulation?, Wall St. J., Apr. 6, 1976, at 22, coL 3. To the automobile industry such reform
means relief from many safety and pollution regulations. United States Automobile Industry
Statement by the President, 17 WEEKLY COMp. PREs. Doc. 403 (Apr. 6, 1981).
To the consumer movement, which generally favors the types of safety and pollution regula-
tion from which the automobile industry has sought relief, reform means eliminating government
intervention that prevents competition. See, ag., Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 49 U.S.C.
§ 1305(a) (Supp. IV 1980); Hemenway, Railroading Anttust at the ICC, THE MONOPOLY MAK-
ERS: RALPH NADER's STUDY GROUP REPORT ON REGULATION AND COMPETION 139 (M.
Green ed. 1973) (trucking); and Pillal, The CAB as Travel Regulator, id at 159 (airlines).
Only substantive programmatic reforms can meet the foregoing types of concern. Demands
for procedural reform, which seek changes in the way the government accomplishes its program-
matic goals, also fall under the regulatory reform umbrella. Cooper, Regulatory Reform?, 35
FOOD DRUo COSM. LJ. 193, 194 (1980).
The ability of agencies to create binding regulations that carry the force and effect of law
raises the hackles of many, notwithstanding the legitimacy of the agencies' delegated powers. See,
.g., Butcher, he Stfling Costs of Regulation, Bus. WK, Nov. 6, 1978, at 22, 24; Ford, The High
Cost of Regulation, NEwswEEK, Mar. 20, 1978, at 15.
The notice and comment method of rulemaking, hailed by some as a brilliant procedural
innovation in administrative law, I IL DAVIS, ADmNvSrRATnvE LAw TREATiSE, §6:1 (2d ed. 1978),
has been the subject of increasing criticism. Participant-critics have sought to increase their role in
informal rulemaking by the addition of oral hearings and cross-examination. They at one time
received considerable support from judges, particularly the members of the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals, who required agencies to supplement normal notice and comment procedures
with additional procedures. See, eg., Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 651-52 (D.C. Cir. 1973); see also Cali-
fornia Optometric Ass'n v. Lackner, 60 Cal. App. 3d 500, 509-11, 131 Cal. Rptr. 744, 750-52
(1976). The United States Supreme Court ended this practice, however, holding that courts may
not require agencies to employ more involved procedures than those mandated for informal
rulemaking by § 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976). Vermont Yan-
ke Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
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or are studying legislation paralleling California's innovations.5
California's regulatory reform plan includes both substantive and
procedural innovations. The procedural reforms increase the formality
of notice-and-comment rulemaking. Agencies must now provide more
information and explanation in the mandated notice of rulemaking,
hold oral hearings when demanded by interested individuals, respond
to public comment on proposed rules, and incorporate the entire
rulemaking proceeding into a rulemaking file.6 Similar requirements
have already been imposed on federal rulemaking by executive order,7
and pending federal legislation is also likely to incorporate such
reforms."
In contrast to the procedural reforms of the California plan, which
roughly parallel those imposed on or proposed for the federal agencies,
the substantive reforms diverge from their federal counterparts. Under
the California plan, all regulations must pass two major substantive
tests: before promulgation, agencies must prove both that they have
authority to issue a particular regulation and that the regulation is nec-
essary.9 Federal reformers have focused instead on whether the bene-
fits of a regulation outweigh its costs.10 The California plan empowers
the new Office of Administrative Law (OAL) to oversee the regulatory
process and to enforce the procedural and substantive standards em-
bodied in the plan.11 This development radically departs from prior
Demand for "open" government resulted in the passage of such laws as the Freedom of
Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) (release of government-held informa-
tion); the Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b (1976) (public meetings required for
muti-member government agencies); and the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. App. I
(1976 & Supp. IV 1980) (public meetings required for advisory committees). A number of states
have passed parallel legislation. See, eag., Public Records Act, CAL GOV'T CODE §§ 6250-6265
(West 1980); Ralph M. Brown Act, CAL. GOV'T CODE § 54950 (West 1980) (open meetings re-
quired for local government agencies); State Agency Act, CAL. GOv'T CODE § 11120 (West 1980)
(open meetings required for state agencies).
5. Four states (Arizona, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Texas) have introduced legislation
modeled after the California law. Four additional states (Georgia, Indiana, New York, and Wis-
consi), Australia, and the Canadian province of Quebec have studied the California law to con-
sider its application. 1981-82 OAL ANNuAL REP. 2 (Office of Administrative Law) (Director's
Message). The Arizona proposal-H.B. 2217, introduced Jan. 19, 1982, 35th Leg., 2d Sess.-virtu-
ally copies A.B. 1111, the cornerstone of California's reforms; see infra notes 13-26.
6. See 47fra text accompanying notes 27-41.
7. See infra text accompanying note 28.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 39-40, 43, 50, 143. Because several of the provisions of
pending federal regulatory reform legislation are similar to provisions of the California plan, an
examination of the California plan may shed light on the wisdom of the proposed federal reforms.
Accordingly, this article notes similarities to proposed federal legislation in the California plan.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 45-62.
10. See infra note 89.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 64-84.
[Vol. 1983:231
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law; previously, only the courts reviewed the validity of regulations.
Federal reforms have vested similar authority in the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget (OMB).' 2
This article describes California's regulatory reform plan, 13 and
reviews and analyzes the results of its first two years of operation. The
description reveals a sweeping plan for review of all existihg and future
regulatory enactments. The procedural and substantive innovations
that the plan imposed were intended to reduce the number of regula-
tions and to improve their quality. Analysis of the procedural changes
reveals some flaws and excesses but also discloses process modifications
that are well designed to focus agency and public attention on the criti-
cal issues underlying regulatory choice. The substantive provisions,
however, present considerable problems. Most significantly, the ill-de-
fined requirement that the OAL. review each regulation for necessity
inevitably shifts policymaking power from the agencies to their re-
viewer. This shift has potentially negative ramifications for those deci-
sions in which agency perspective, philosophy, and judgment properly
play a significant role. Accordingly, the article proposes modifications
that would maintain the advantages of centralized regulatory review
while minimizing interference with agency judgment.
II. THE CALIFORNIA PLAN 14
A. Background, Purpose, and Scope of the Caifornia Plan.
California's legislators responded to demands for regulatory re-
form by proposing a number of bills,15 most of which relied on the
legislative veto' 6 and the sunset clause 17 to control regulatory discre-
12. Successive presidents have empowered the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), an
arm of the Executive Office of the President, to exert control over federal regulatory processes.
Federal regulatory reform legislation is likely to incorporate presidential oversight of at least some
aspects of the regulatory process. See infra note 63. See generally Symposium. Presidential Inter-
vention inAdmin.itrative Rlemaking, 56 TuL. L. Ray. 811 (1982).
13. The California legislature initially enacted the regulatory reform mechanism as A.B.
1111, 1979 Cal. Stat. 567, which became effective for the most part on July 1, 1980.
14. Two descriptions of the California reforms published early in the life of the program are
PRICE, EXECUTIVE CONTROL OF RuLEmAKiNG: THE OFFICE OF ADMINIsTRATIvE LAW IN
CALIFORNIA, REPORT TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES
(Washington, D.C. Apr. 1981) and Starr, Caljfornia's New Office ofAdministrative Law and Other
Amenents to the California APA: A Bureau to Curb Bureaucracy and Judicial Review, Too, 32
AD. L. REV. 713 (1980).
15. M. HERNANDEZ, supra note 3, at app. 5 (listing regulatory reform bills pending in
legislature).
16. A legislative veto provision vests authority in a committee, one house, or both houses of a
legislature to review and disapprove administrative regulations. The process is designed to be less
burdensome than the passage of legislation to overturn agency actions, and does not require exec-
utive (presidential or gubernatorial) approval. The United States Supreme Court has just
Val. 1983:231]
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tion. Assembly Bill (A.B.) 1111, which instituted the California plan,
was offered as a less radical approach to the problem of regulatory re-
form.18 The bill became law in 1979 and was amended in 19819 and
1982.20 It provides for increased executive control of the regulatory
process through changed procedures and substantive standards, with
enforcement by a semi-autonomous agency of the executive branch, the
OAL.21
In establishing the OAL and charging it with oversight of all new
and existing regulations, the California Legislature declared its intent
"that the purpose of such review shall be to reduce the number of ad-
ministrative regulations and to improve the quality of those regulations
which are adopted. ' 22 The desire to reduce the number of regulations
is understandable considering the sheer volume of regulations promul-
gated by California agencies: 28,000 pages - 14 feet23 - of regula-
declared the legislative veto unconstitutional, see Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v.
Chadha, 51 U.S.L.W. 4907 (U.S. June 21, 1983). For a general discussion of the legislative veto,
see Bruff & Gellhorn, Congressional Control of Administrative Regulation. A Study of Legislative
Vetoes, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1369, 1371 (1977).
17. Sunset laws terminate agency programs or agencies themselves unless the legislature spe-
cifically reauthorizes the program or agency. Adams, Sunset: A Proposalfor Accountable Govern.
ment, 28 AD. L. Rav. 511, 520 (1976). Although 35 states have enacted sunset laws, observers
suggest that their impact on deregulation has been limited. One state has repealed its sunset law,
and repeal legislation has been introduced in six other states. Carlson, Success of Sunset Laws
Vaies as Fi'hts Turn to Big Targets, Wall St. J., May 4, 1982, at 29, col.l; see also Erbin, Has The
Sun Set on Sunset?: A Postmortem in Calfornia, CAL.. REO. L. Rm., Summer 1981, at 2.
18. California's former Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr., a number of his powerful Demo-
cratic allies in the legislature, and a coalition of liberals, environmentalists, and labor unions
opposed a legislative veto amendment to the California Constitution. This coalition offered A.B,
1111 as a substitute regulatory-reform package. Former Assembly Speaker Leo T. McCarthy au-
thored the bill, which was introduced on March 22, 1979. The bill was enacted rapidly and was
passed by an almost unanimous vote. The backers of A.B. 111 successfully blocked the legisla-
tive veto amendment.
The political background of A.B. 1111 is examined in Walters, Regulating the Regulations,
CAL. LAW., Jan. 1982, at 34. The article misstates the year of the critical events, erroneously citing
1980 as the date of passage of A.B. 1111. A.B. 1111 was introduced in 1979, approved by the
Governor, and filed on September 11, 1979. See also Price, supra note 14, at 1, 23, 24 n.22.
19. Chapters 592, 604, 814, 865, 983, and 1091 of the 1981 California Statutes significantly
modified the regulatory reform parts of the California Administrative Procedure Act. SeeAdmin-
btrative Law, Review of Selected 1981 California Legilation, 13 PAc. L.J. 513, 537-38 (1982).
20. Chapters 61, 1083, 1211, 1236, 1544, and 1573 of the 1982 California Statutes significantly
modified portions of the California Administrative Procedure Act affecting regulatory reform.
21. Some of the procedural reforms incorporated into A.B. 1111 had previously been pro-
posed to apply to rulemaking by the California Occupational Safety and Health Standards Board.
See Preprint A.B. 7 (Assembly Subcomm. on Industrial Safety, 1977), §§ 1 (improved information
in notice), 3 (expanded "basis and purpose" statement), & 4 (rulemaking fie).
22. 1979 Cal. Stat. 567, §1 (codified as CAL. GOv'T CODE § 11340.1 (West 1980)). Unless
otherwise noted, all statutory citations are to sections of the California Government Code.
23. Smith, The State's Shrinking Pains in Cutting Government Red Tape, XIII CAL.. J. 218
(June 1982).
[Vol. 1983:231
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tions were in force at the time A.B. 1111 was passed. 24
The boldness of the California reform is most evident in its all-
encompassing scope. A.B. I111 requires the agencies and the OAL to
review all existing and all new regulations. The task25 - recall the
28,000 pages - is enormous. Federal reformers have never been will-
ing to tackle the parallel task of reviewing the entire Code of Federal
Regulations. 26
24. The California Administrative Code grew from 13,500 pages in 1974 to 28,000 pages in
1979; both Democratic and Republican legislators referred to these numbers in statements about
A.B. 1111, Starr, .upra note 14, at 713. Similarly, between 1970 and 1974 the Code of Federal
Regulations grew from 54,105 to 69,270 pages. Miller, Lessons of the Economic Impact Statement
Program, REG., July-Aug. 1977, at 15.
25. A.B. 1111 includes strict deadlines for review of each title of the California Administra-
tive Code: it requires completion of regulatory review by June 30, 1986. § 11349.8 (West 1980).
Governor Brown, at the request of the OAL, dccelerated the review of existing regulations so that
it would be completed by December 31, 1982. See Smith, supra note 23 at 219; Exec. Order No.
B72-80 (Oct. 9, 1980), 1980 OFFicE OF THE GOVERNOR RELEASES 392 (2,3); Erbin and Fellmeth,
The Office ofAdministrative Law. ReguktoryRefonn or an Ayatollahfor California?, CAL. REO. L.
REP., Spring 1981, at 2. This completion date coincided with the end of Governor Brown's term
of office.
26. The Code of Federal Regulations took up almost 22 linear feet of library shelf space in
October 1982.
President Carter's Executive Order (Improving Government Regulations), Exec. Order No.
12,044,3 C.F.R. 152 (1979), extendedby Exec. Order No. 12,221,3 C.F.R. 266 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as Carter Order], mandated that agencies "periodically review their existing regulations to
determine whether they are achieving the policy goals of this Order," id § 4, but the analytic
procedures required by the Order for rulemaking were limited to "significant" regulations, id
§ (2)(e), or significant regulations with "major economic consequences," id § 3.
President Reagan's Executive Order (Federal Regulation), Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R.
127 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Reagan Order], imposed Regulatory Impact and Analysis Review
on "major" rules only, id § 3. A "major" rule is defined in the Reagan Order as one that is likely
to result in:
(1) An annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more;
(2) A major increase in costs or prices for consumers, individual industries, Federal,
State, or local government agencies, or geographic regions; or
(3) Significant adverse effects on competition, employment, investment, productivity, in-
novation, or on the ability of United States-based enterprises to compete with foreign-
based enterprises in domestic or export markets.
Id § 1(b).
The rate of rejection of rules reviewed under the Reagan Order was slightly less than eight
percent during its first 100 days in effect. EXCERPTS FROM: THE FIRST 100 DAYS OF E.O. 12291,
"FEDERAL REGULATION": A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON REGULATORY RE-
LIEF, Staff of the Office of Management and Budget, June 6, 1981, at 3. The OAL, on the other
hand, had an overall rejection rate of3l percent in 1981-82- 1981-82 OAT, ANNUAL REP., 6-7. S.
1080, supra note 2, would have mandated review within ten years of all existing major rules. The
definition of a "major rule" in this legislation was similar to that in the Reagan Order. 128 CONG.
REc. S2715 (daily ed. March 24, 1982).
Both Presidents Carter and Reagan conceded that their Orders did not apply to the independ-
ent regulatory agencies. Reagan Order, -upra § l(d); Carter Order, supra § 6(b)(5). In contrast,
OAL has authority over all 124 California agencies except the Public Utilities Commission and
the Division of Industrial Accidents. § 11351; Price, supra note 16, at 26, 29, 1981-82 OAL AN-
NUAL REP., 11.
Vol 1983".231)
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B. Innovations Increasing Public Information.
A number of the procedural innovations of A.B. 1111 and its prog-
eny facilitate public participation in the rulemaking process. The bill
extends the time for allowing comment on any proposed rule from 30
to 45 days.27 Also, in addition to the "informative digest" required pre-
viously, the agency must now include in the notice of rulemaking "ref-
erence to the fact that the agency has prepared a statement of the
reasons for the proposed action [and] has available all the information
upon which its proposal is based."'28 The thrust of federal reforms is in
the same direction.29
C. Changes in Rulemaking Procedures.
The hallmark of informal rulemaking has been the use of the no-
tice and comment procedure.30 In the past, this procedure normally
did not involve hearings, 31 and interested parties had no right to be
heard:32 an agency usually would invite only written comments in re-
sponse to the notice of a proposed rule. Now, however, A.B. 1111 and
its progeny forbid agencies using notice and comment rulemaking from
27. Compare § 11423 (West 1966 & Supp. 1980) with § 11346.4 (West 1980 & Supp. 1982).
Mandatory publication of the notice in a newspaper of general circulation, trade or industry pub-
lication (§ 11423(a)) was repealed, leaving the better targeted and less costly methods of notice,
such as mailing the notice to everyone who has filed a request for notice with the agency and
publication in the California Administrative Notice Register. Compare § 11423(b) (West 1966 &
Supp. 1980) with § 11346.4(a) (West 1980 & Supp. 1982).
28. Compare § 11424(a)(3) (West 1966 & Supp. 1980) with § 11346.5(a)(8) (West 1980 &
Supp. 1982).
The initial statement of reasons must include at least:
(1) A description of the public problem, administrative requirement, or other condition
or circumstance the regulation is intended to address.
(2) A statement of the specific purpose of the regulation and the factual basis for the
determination by the agency that the regulation is reasonably necessary to carry out the
purpose for which it is proposed.
(3) An identification of each technical, theoretical, and empirical study, report, or similar
document, if any, on which the agency is relying in proposing the adoption or amend-
ment of a regulation.
(4) A description of any alternatives the agency has identified that would lessen any
adverse impact on small businesses.
§ 11346.7 (a) (West 1980 & Supp. 1982), as amended by 1982 Cal. Stat. 1573, §3.5.
29. S. 1080, supra note 2, § 3, at 128 CONo. Rnc. S2713 (daily ed. March 24, 1982).
30. K. DAv-s ADnNIsTRArVE LAW TEXT, §§ 6.01, 6.03 (3d ed. 1972); United States v.
Florida East Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 234-35 (1973).
31. Courts have at times, however, referred to the procedure as a hearing. See, e.g., United
States v. Florida East Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224,235 1973; American Mining Congress v. Marshall,
671 F.2d 1251, 1261 (10th Cir. 1982); American Trucking Ass'ns v. ICC, 659 F.2d 452, 461 (5th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3647 (U.S. Mar. 7, 1983).
32. § 11425 (West 1966 & Supp. 1980); 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1976).
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refusing a timely demand for a public hearing - a legislative-type oral
proceeding.33
The California reforms also guarantee agency responsiveness to
public input in the hearing process. The adopting agency must submit
to the OAL a final statement of reasons including "a summary of each
objection or comment made regarding the regulation, together with an
explanation of how the proposed regulation has been amended to ac-
commodate each objection or comment, or the reasons for rejecting
each objection or comment. '34
The change with perhaps the greatest potential impact on the
rulemaking process requires that "[elvery agency shall maintain a file
of each rulemaking which shall be deemed to be the record for that
rulemaking proceeding." 35 The California APA, like the federal APA,
had contained no such provision, and traditionally the record of a
rulemaking proceeding has not been a clearly defined body of informa-
tion.36 Instead, it has been a hodge-podge of materials, only assembled
into something called a "record" when required for purposes of judicial
review.37 At the late date of judicial review such a disjointed record
makes it difficult for litigants and courts to distinguish what the agency
relied on at the time of rulemaking from information added later in
justification of the rule.38 A.B. 1111 addresses this issue directly by
specifically defining the rulemaking file.39 For judicial review of the
33. § 11346.8 (West 1980 & Supp. 1982).
Although federal reforms encourage increased use of oral hearings, no proposal would re-
quire such hearings except for major rules. Carter Order, supra note 26, § 2(c); S. 1080, supra note
31, § 3, at S2713. When oral hearings are required by federal law, however, the proposed federal
reform would require an opportunity for cross-examination. Id § 3 at S2714.
34. § 11346.7(b) (West 1980 & Supp. 1982). This provision, adopted in 1981, superseded a
less stringent command in A.B. 1111 that the final statement "include a summary of the primary
considerations raised by persons outside the agency in opposition to the regulation as adopted,
together with a brief explanation of the reasons for rejecting these considerations." § 11346.7(c).
Federal reformers would adopt the approach of the original A.B. 1111 requirement in expanding
the scope of the mandated statement of basis and purpose. See S. 1080, supra note 2, § 3, at
S2714.
35. § 11347.3(a) (West 1980 & Supp. 1982).
36. 1 K. DAvis, supra note 4, §§ 6:5, 6:10, Auerbach, Informal Rule Making: A Proposed
Relationshp Between Administrative Procedures and Judicial Review, 72 Nw. U.L. Rav. 15, 23-24
(1977). See generally DeLong, InformaRulemaking and the Integration of Law andPolicy, 65 VA.
L. REv. 257, 271-72 (hybrid rulemaking requirements).
37. See, eg., Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142-43 (1973); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419-20 (1971); Texas v. EPA, 499 F.2d 289, 297 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
427 U.S. 905 (1975); Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495, 507 (4th Cir. 1973); California
Ass'n of Nursing Homes v. Williams, 4 Cal. App. 3d 800, 813, 84 Cal. Rptr. 590, 599 (1970);
McGowan, Rtflections on Rulemaking Review, 53 Tua. L Rnv. 681, 687 (1979).
38. A.B. 1111 permitspost hoc justifications to support regulations resubmitted to OAL after
initial disapproval. See infra note 107.
39. A.B. 1111 defines the rulemaking file as:
(1) Petitions concerning the regulation,
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agency's determination that the regulation is reasonably necessary,40
the record will consist of the rulemaking file; the OAL's necessity re-
view is restricted to that fle.41
D. Clarity Requirement.
The California Legislature gave the California Administrative
Code very bad reviews for its literary merit.42 Its solution was to re-
quire that the OAL review all regulations for clarity.43 By statute,
"clarity" means "written or displayed so that the meaning of regula-
tions will be easily understood by those persons directly affected by
them."44
E. Requirement of Rulemaking Authority.
An agency may make rules only if authorized to do so. 45 Accord-
ingly, whether a particular rule is in fact authorized by statute is a fre-
quent issue in litigation over the validity of adopted rules.46 In a
(2) Published notices,
"(3) All data and other factual information, any studies or reports, and written comments submit-
ted to the agency in connection with the adoption, amendment, or repeal of the regulation.
(4) All data and other factual information, technical, theoretical, and empirical studies or reports,
if any, on which the agency is relying..."
(5) Transcripts, recordings, or minutes of public hearings,
(6) Mandated statements of reasons,
(7) Any other information that the agency is required by law to consider.
§ 11347.3(a) (West Supp. 1983).
40. See mifra notes 53-62 and accompanying text.
41. §§ 11350(b) (West 1980); 11349.1 (West 1980). Proposed federal reform legislation is re-
markably parallel to California law on the rulemaking record issue. California's rulemaking pro-
cedures after A.B. 1111 contrast sharply with the long-applicable requirements of the federal
Administrative Procedure Act. The provisions of 5 U.S.C. section 553 are currently a spare frame-
work. Passage of the Regulatory Reform Act would make federal requirements more like those of
California. See S. 1080, supra note 2, at S2713.
42. '"he language of many regulations is frequently unclear and unnecessarily complex,
even when the complicated and technical nature of the subject matter is taken into account. The
language is often confusing to the persons who must comply with the regulations." § 11340(b)
(West 1980).
43. § 11349.1 (West 1980).
44. § 11349 (West 1980). President Carter's executive order included a similar "plain Eng-
lish" requirement. Carter Order, supra note 26, § 2(d)(5).
45. See K. DAvis, supra note 30, §§ 2.01, 2.04; American Trucking Ass'ns v. ICC, 659 F.2d
452, 469-70 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3647 (U.S. Mar. 7, 1983); In re Permanent
Surface Mining Regulation Litig., 653 F.2d 514, 523 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cerl. denied, 454 U.S.
822 (1981); Office of Consumers' Counsel v. FERC, 655 F.2d 1132, 1141, 1147-48 (D.C. Cir. 1980);
Trans-Pacific Freight Conference v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 650 F.2d 1235, 1244, 1248 (D.C.
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 984 (1981); National Indus. Sand Ass'n v. Marshall, 601 F.2d 689,
701-04 (3d Cir. 1979); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1024, 1040-41 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
46. See, eg., Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. First Lincolnwood Corp., 439
U.S. 234, 236-37 (1978); SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 106 (1978); Gardner v. Toilet Goods Ass'n,
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reform with potentially great impact, the legislature made OAL ap-
proval contingent on the OAL finding that the regulation is author-
ized.4 7 The statute defines authority as "the provision of law which
permits or obligates the agency" to make the regulation.48 Two addi-
tional standards by which the OAL must judge a proposed regulation,
consistency49 and reference, 50 also relate to the agency's authority to
adopt the rule. The consistency standard requires that the regulation
not conflict with any existing law, 51 the reference standard requires the
agency to articulate which statute, court opinion, or other legal provi-
sion the regulation implements.52 The authority standard similarly re-
quires that the agency cite the provision giving it rulemaking power.
Both the authority and consistency standards require the OAL to
make legal judgments about the basic legitimacy of the agency's action.
Reference, although related, is almost entirely procedural in its nature.
It requires only that the agency cite those provisions of law that it be-
lieves it is implementing.
F. Requirement of Necessityfor Rule.
The most controversial5 3 and important standard of review imple-
mented by A.B. 1111 is "necessity." Since early in the history of the
California Administrative Procedure Act, regulations have had to be
"reasonably necessafy" to survive judicial review.54 A.B. 1111 left un-
touched the "reasonably necessary" requirement in the section con-
cerning the validity of regulations,55 and added language requiring
regulations to be "reasonably necessary" to the section on declaratory
relief.56 At the same time, it included "necessity" as* one of the stan-
387 U.S. 167, 169-70 (1967); Industrial Welfare Comm'n v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. 3d 690, 719,
613 P. 2d 579, 594-95, 166 Cal. Rptr. 331, 346-47, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1034 (1980); Credit Ins.
Gen. Agents Ass'n v. Payne, 16 Cal. 3d 651, 657, 547 P.2d 993, 996-97, 128 Cal. Rptr. 881, 884-85
(1976).
47. § 11349.1 (West 1980).
48. § 11349(b) (West 1980).
49. § 11349.1 (West 1980).
50. Id
51. § 11349(d) (West 1980). The definition was broadened in 1982 to require that a regula-
tion not conflict with "existing statutes, court decisions, or other provisions of law." 1982 Cal.
Stat. 1573, § 4.
52. § 11349(e) (West 1980).
53. See Erbin and Fellmeth, supra note 25, at 5-6; ADMINISTRATIVE RuLEmAAiNo (Assem-
bly Office of Research [California] Mar. 1982), at 29 [hereinafter cited as ADMISTRATIVE
RULEMAKING].
54. 1951 Cal. Stat. 479, § 1.
55. § 11342.2 (West 1980).
56. § 11350(b) (West 1980).
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dards against which OAL must evaluate a regulation before its filing.57
As originally adopted in 1979, the necessity standard was defined
as "the need for a regulation as demonstrated in the record of the
rulemaking proceeding." 58 In 1982, the legislature amended the stan-
dard, adopting in essence the definition of necessity that the OAL had
proposed to govern its own operations,5 9 and rejected alternatives. 60
The OAL defined necessity as follows:
(a) A regulatory interpretation, requirement or prohibition is
necessary when the record of the rulemaking proceeding, taken as a
whole, contains substantial evidence supporting the agency's deter-
mination that the regulatory provision is necessary.
(b) Necessity is not demonstrated by speculative assertions or
opinions which are unsupported by facts.6'
However defined, the necessity review standard requires the OAL
to make a substantive judgment based on the contents of the rulemak-
57. §§ 11349, 11349.1 (West 1980).
58. § 11349 (West 1980). A 1981 amendment to A.B. 1111 added that a regulation would not
satisfy the necessity standard if it "servels] the same purpose as another regulation. This standard
requires that an agency proposing to adopt any new regulation must identify any other state regu-
lation which is overlapped or duplicated by the proposed regulation and justify any overlap or
duplication." § 11349 (West 1980 & Supp. 1982). In 1982, the legislature separated the duplica-
tion issue from necessity, creating a sixth review standard. 1982 Cal. Stat. 1544, § 1; 1573, § 4.
This change was one of format rather than substance, as nonduplication already existed as part of
the necessity standard. The legislature made the change to enable the addition of the substantial
evidence standard to the necessity definition, see infra text accompanying notes 223-26; Memoran-
dum prepared by the office of Hon. Leo T. McCarthy, Speaker Pro Tempore of the Assembly
(Apr. 7, 1982) (explaining A.B. 2820, following a hearing of the Select Committee on Regulatory
Oversight) [California Assembly] (on file with the author).
59. 1982 Cal. Stat. 1573, § 4.
60. The legislature rejected the following language:
An agency has complied with this standard when there are sufficient facts, credible testi-
mony, informed assessments, and other information of a persuasive nature in the record
of the rulemaking proceeding taken as a whole to demonstrate that the agency's decision
to adopt or amend the regulation is supported by fair and substantial reasons and that
the content of the regulation is related directly to the purposes of the statute which au-
thorizes the rulemaking.
A.B. 3322, introduced Mar. 11, 1982. This bill was amended to eliminate this language and passed
as amended. 1982 CaL Stat. 1544.
61. Art. 6, § 160, PROPOSED REGULATIONS, OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 82 Cal. Ad-
mi. Reg., No. 22-Z (May 29, 1982), at A-5 to A-6 [hereinafter cited as PROPOSED REoUL.ATIONS].
In its original instructions to the agencies in 1980, OAL had suggested a two-part analysis of
necessity, as follows:
First, the general question of whether regulations in the particular area are needed at all
should be asked. What public interest is served by governmental regulation in this area?
Why must government be involved? What is lacking in the private enterprise, free mar-
ket system that requires governmental intervention?
Secondly, is this particular regulation necessary? Is there another, less burdensome
approach? Does the benefit of this regulation outweigh its costs? Has the regulation
outgrown its usefulness? Has the regulation had any adverse unintended consequences?
Instructions for the A.B. 1111 Review of Existing Regulations (Oct. 24, 1980), reprinted in Price,
supra note 14, at B-5, B-6.
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ing file. A.B. 1111 strictly limits this substantive review: "It is the intent
of the Legislature that neither the Office of Administrative Law nor the
court should substitute its judgment for that of the rulemaking agency
as expressed in the substantive content of adopted regulations." 62
G. OAL's Authority and Procedures.
A.B. 1111 grants the OAL broad authority to oversee the adoption
of new regulations and agency review of existing regulations.63 The
OAL assures compliance with the various rulemaking requirements by
refusing to publish noncomplying rules in the California Administra-
tive Notice Register," which is prepared and published by the OAL.6 5
All agencies must transmit a copy of each rulemaking file to the
OAL for its review to determine whether the agency met the six stan-
dards of necessity, authority, clarity, consistency, reference and
nonduplication.66 The only exception is for repeal of any regulation,
62. § 11340.1 (West 1980). This limitation was a late amendment to the bill. It first appeared
in Senate amendments of July 1979, responding to concerns of the Senate Judiciary Committee
that the necessity standard was ambiguous and may have allowed OAL to rule on the efficacy of
regulations. HISTORY, A.B. 111 1, as amended, July 4, 1979, at 4, in Government Regulations-Office
of Administrative Law, Senate Committee on Judiciary; Starr supra note 14, at 716 & n.31, 717.
In 1982, the legislature reaffirmed its intent that the OAL not substitute its judgment for that
of the agencies. An amendment that mandates the OAL to adopt regulations governing its own
operations requires that those regulations ensure that OAL not substitute its judgment for that of
the adopting agency. 1982 Cal. Stat. 1573, § 4.
63. The OAL's enforcement power contrasts with the lesser authority of the OMB or any
other presidential delegate under federal executive orders or proposed legislation. The Carter
Order, supra note 26, required agencies to report compliance to the OMB, which was "to assure
the effective implementation" of the Order and report to the President semiannually on its effec-
tiveness. Id § 5. The Order mentions no methods to assure implementation. See DeMuth, supra
note 4, at 20-22. The Director of OMB has greater power under the Reagan Order. For example,
the Director may order that a rule be treated as a major rule, thus mandating regulatory impact
analysis and review. See supra note 26, § 3(b). The Director must review rules subject to the
Order, and agencies are forbidden to publish rules until such review is concluded. Id § 3(f). But
the OMB's role is not to "be construed as displacing the agencies' responsibilities delegated by
law." Id § 3(f)(3). An agency may be delayed in publishing final rules and is required to incor-
porate OMB's views and the agency's response in the rulemaking file. Id § 3(f)(2). The Order,
however, does not prevent a determined agency from adopting a rule opposed by the OMB.
Although S. 1080 provides that "the President shall have the authority to establish procedures
for agency compliance... [and] to monitor, review, and ensure agency implementation of such
procedures," S. 1080, supra note 2, at S2716, the actual scope of the President's enforcement
power was left unclear. If the Senate intended the President to ensure compliance by preventing
issuance of final agency rules, that authority should be more clearly delineated.
64. § 11346.4 (West 1980). Hernandez feund the power to disapprove rules to be a character-
istic of effective regulatory review programs. M. HENANEz, supra note 3, at 2.
65. § 11344 (West 1980).
66. §§ 11347.3; 11349.1 (West 1980), as amended by 1982 Cal. Stat. 1544, § 1.
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over which the OAL has only limited reviewing authority.67 The OAL
has thirty days either to approve a regulation or to return it to the
agency with written reasons why it was disapproved. 68
On disapproval the agency has several choices. It may rewrite the
regulation or provide further supporting information and resubmit it to
the OAL. If the regulation has been significantly changed, the agency
must repeat the notice and comment procedure and, if there is a timely
demand, hold a public hearing.69 Alternatively, the agency may appeal
the disapproval to the Governor, who may overrule the OAL's deci-
sion.70 If the Governor overrules the OAL, the regulation is im-
mediately fled.71 The agency's third choice is to negotiate with the
OAL to reach a mutually acceptable accommodation. Such negotiation
usually involves modifying the language of the regulation somewhat.72
If the OAL ultimately withholds its approval, and the Governor does
not overrule the decision, the regulation cannot be filed. 73
The review process differs for existing regulations. A.B. 1111 re-
quired each agency with existing regulations to submit a plan for re-
view of those regulations. 74 The plan was required to include
67. Until 1983, the OAL had no review authority over repeals. A 1982 amendment gave the
OAL the power to disapprove repealers that were not adopted in compliance with mandated
rulemaking procedures. § 11349.2 (West 1980), as amended by 1982 Cal. Stat. 1573, § 6.
68. § 11349.3 (West 1980). The OAL disapproves regulations by sending a letter to the sub-
mitting agency, stating its reasons for disapproval. From July 1980 until July 1981 the OALs
disapproval letters were not published. The author reviewed the disapproval letters by reviewing
the general correspondence files kept by James M. Mattesich, Deputy Director and General Coun-
sel of the OAL. This review focused almost exclusively on letters expressing failure to meet the
necessity requirement; many of the "necessity" disapprovals also reflected failure to meet other
review standards. Beginning with the July 25, 1981 edition of the California Administrative No-
tice Register (Register 81, No. 30-Z), the OAL has published virtually all of its disapproval letters,
its correspondence with the Governor concerning appeals of its decisions, and the Governor's
decisions on those appeals. The data in this article reflect the selective review of the Mattesich
files and complete review of all the published materials through 82 Cal. Admin. Reg. No. 25-7,
published June 23, 1982. The source base for this article consists of approximately 230 sets of
disapproved regulations (including what should constitute all of the disapprovals from July 1981
to June 1982) and 24 appeals to the Governor (the total number of appeals to the Governor from
the OAL's inception to mid-June 1982).
The sources are cited by reference to the date of each letter and its addressee and, if pub-
lished, to the California Administrative Notice Register. See, eg., infra note 97.
69. § 11349.4 (West 1980).
70. § 11349.5 (West 1980). The statute does not require the Governor to base the decision on
the rulemaking file or any other standard. Starr, supra note 14, at 723.
71. §11349.5 (West 1980).
72. The OAL negotiates some clarity or reference changes in about 10 percent of all submis-
sions. Telephone interview with Gene Livingston, first Director of the OAL (resigned effective
October 31, 1982) (August 10, 1982) (tape recording on file with author) [hereinafter cited as
Livingston Interview]; see also Erbin and Feilmeth, supra note 25, at 6; Price, supra note 14, at 15.
73. § 11349.3. (West 1980).
74. § 11349.7 (West 1980).
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mechanisms for public participation.75 The initial review resulted in a
"Statement of Review Completion," indicating to the OAL whether
each reviewed regulation would be retained, repealed, or amended.76
Agencies have six months after this report to complete and submit to
the OAL any amendments or repeals.77 The OAL then has jurisdiction
for six months after the final agency action to review that action for
compliance with the review standards.78 If a regulation fails to meet
any of the standards, the OAL can order the adopting agency to show
cause why the regulation should not be repealed.7 9 The order to show
cause procedure appears designed to create a record to substitute for
the rulemaking file in those cases in which an agency has decided to
retain a regulation unchanged. 0 If, after the agency responds to the
order to show cause, the OAL still believes the regulation in question to
be nonconforming, it may order the regulation repealed.,' Agency ap-
peal to the Governor from this decision is available.8 2
An agency may dispense with most of the procedures necessary for
rulemaking by adopting a regulation as an emergency measure. Nor-
mal rulemaking procedures must follow adoption of an "emergency"
rule; however, or it will expire after 120 days. 3 The OAL has the
power to oversee the required agency declaration that the emergency
adoption or repeal of a regulation is "necessary for the immediate pres-
ervation of the public peace, health and safety or general welfare." 4
III. THE CALiFoRmiA PLAN: ANALYsIS AND EVALUATION
In the statement of goals, the legislators who adopted the Califor-
nia plan gave equal weight to reduction of the number of regulations
and improvement in their quality.8 5 Like all legislation, A.B. 1111 and
75. This requirement emanates from Governor Brown's Executive Order, which provided,
"State agencies shall insure that representatives of persons who are affected by their regulations
are effectively involved in the review of all existing regulations." Exec. Order No. B72-80, .supra
note 25.
76. § 11349.7 (West 1980). After two years, 86 agencies had reviewed 23,942 regulations and
slated 5,690 of them for repeal and 7,907 for amendment. 1981-82 OAL ANNUAL REP. 3, 10-11.
77. § 11349.7 (West 1980).
78. Id
79. § 11349.7(h) (West 1980).
80. See § 11349.7(i),(j) (West 1980), as wnendedby 1982 Cal. Stat. 1236, § 4.
81. § 11349.70) (West 1980). By June 30, 1982, OAL was challenging 3,556 regulations via
the issuance of 90 Orders to Show Cause. 1981-82 OAL ANNUAL REP. 3, 11.
82. § 11349.7(k) (West 1980).
83. § 11346.1(b),(e) (West 1980), as amended by 1982 Cal. Stat. 1573, §2.
84. §11349.6 (West 1980).
85. § 11340.1 (West 1980 & Supp. 1983); see supra text accompanying note 22.
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its progeny are the result of compromise among legislators with con-
flicting goals and motivations. 86
A.B. 1111 melds two conflicting views of regulatory reform. One
view disfavors government regulation and would limit it severely, leav-
ing regulation to the pressures of the marketplace rather than to gov-
ernment.87 Under this view, only regulation that improves on
conditions created by market forces should be adopted.88 Regulatory
reformers at the federal level who hold this view have introduced cost-
benefit analysis into the rulemaking process.8 9 In California the re-
quirement of proof of "necessity" 9 most succinctly accomplishes the
same goal. However, the difficulty of assigning meaning to the neces-
sity standard 91 suggests that legislators of varying ideologies may have
had different purposes in agreeing to this terminology. The denial of
jurisdiction to the OAL to review repeals of regulations except for pro-
cedural regularity far better reflects the perspective that the best regula-
tion is no regulation at al. 92
A.B. 1111 also reflects the view that what is needed to cure the
excesses of regulation are process improvements, particularly those that
would generate informed public participation in rulemaking.93 The
California plan's modifications of the traditional notice and comment
86. See supra text accompanying notes 15-21.
87. Friedman, Regulatory Schizophrenia, NEWSWEEK, June 29, 1981, at 65; Noll, Breaking
Out of the Regulatory Dileman Altenzatives to the Sterile Choice, 51 IND. L.J. 686, 686 (1976);
Schmults, Government Regulation - Is Regulatory Rform a Challenge or a Myth?, 33 Bus. LAW.
441, 441-43 (1977). Price claims that OAL's perception is that its mission is to reduce regulation.
Price, supra note 14, at 14.
88. See Reich, Waring Critiques of Regulation, REO., Jan.-Feb. 1979, at 37, 38.
89. See Reagan Order, supra note 26, § 2(b) ("Regulatory actions shall not be undertaken
unless the potential benefits to society for [sic] the regulation outweigh the potential costs to soci-
ety"); S. 1080, supra note 2, at S2715.
The use of a cost-benefit analysis technique in rulemaking elicits anguished concern, espe-
cially from persons who are ideologically disposed in favor of regulation. See, e.g., FederalRegu.
lation and Regulatory Reform: Excerpts from the Moss Committee Report, 29 AD. L. REv. 399,
405-17 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Excerpts from the Moss Committee Report]; Rosenberg, supra
note 2, at 195, 214-15 n.94, 219 n.109; Ralph Nader on Regulation (Letter to the Editor), Wash.
Post, Feb. 14, 1979, at A22, coL 3; Green, The Faked Case Against Regulation, Wash. Post, Jan.
21, 1979, at Cl, col. 1. See Remarks of Michael S. Baram, Panel , supra note 4, at 179-82. But
see Schuck, On the Chicken Little School of Regulation, Wash. Post, Jan. 28, 1979, at Cl, col. 1.
90. § 11349.1 (West 1980).
91. See infra text accompanying notes 197-220.
92. § 11349.2 (West 1980); Starr, supra note 14, at 716; see supra note 67. Unlike the courts,
the OAL has no jurisdiction to determine whether a repealer is substantively appropriate. Cf.
State Farm Ins. Co. v. DOT, 680 F.2d 206 (D.C. Cir.) (holding rescission of automobile crash
protection safety standard arbitrary and illogical), vacated, 51 U.S.L.W. 4953 (U.S. June 21, 1983).
93. Reich, supra note 88, at 37, refers to this ideology as the "political responsiveness cri-
tique" of regulation, in contrast to the "economic impact critique," which demands cost-benefit
analysis, see supra text accompanying notes 87-89. Reich claims that the two critiques are at war.
See Reich, supra note 88, at 42.
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pattern for rulemaking are of this sort, designed to enable the public
both to understand agency proposals better and to have more impact
on the final outcome of agency deliberations.94
Both views - the regulatory reform programs of which, reduced
to their most basic elements, can be denominated as procedural reform
and substantive reform - are blended in California's regulatory re-
form plan. The compromise that became A.B. 1111 was politically ac-
ceptable because it enabled legislators to vote against regulatory excess
and for diminished government intrusion, both universally favored
goals. Concurrently, politicians whose constituents favor retention of
regulatory programs were able to argue that the plan would retain all
necessary regulations; those politicians whose constituents oppose most
regulation were able to point to the stringency of the adopted test of
necessity. The question to be explored is whether the outcome of this
politically acceptable compromise is theoretically sound.
To be theoretically sound, procedural reforms should enable col-
lection and analysis of important factual information and also direct
public and agency attention to the critical policy decisions that must be
resolved in making regulatory choices. Procedural reforms should
achieve these purposes without burdening agencies with papershuffling
tasks that add to neither the soundness of regulatory choices nor the
accessibility of the regulatory process to the public.
Whether one views substantive reforms as theoretically sound de-
pends on the value one places on regulation. Because the California
system reflects a balance of competing ideologies, it should be tested
against the criterion of maintaining balance. The substantive reforms
should provide a review system that imposes on agencies a fair test of
demonstrable authority and necessity for regulations, while neither
placing an impossible obstacle in the path of regulation nor ignoring
the mandate for independent review outside the adopting agency.
Whether the enforcement mechanism selected for the California
reform program, the OAL, is theoretically sound may be determined by
examining the impact of the OAL's functioning on public accessibility,
rulemaking delay, and general power dispersion within the governmen-
tal structure. The viability of alternative enforcement mechanisms also
must be considered in this regard.
A. Implications and Evaluation of Procedural Reform.
1. Initial Statement of Reasons. Many of the A.B. 1111 proce-
dural reforms lessen the agencies' ability to issue regulations in profu-
94. See supra text accompanying notes 27-28.
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HeinOnline -- 1983 Duke L.J.  247 1983
DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1983:231
sion, simply because the rulemaking process has become more complex
and time-consuming. 95 The statement of reasons and underlying infor-
mation requires far more time and thought to prepare than the simpler
informative digest that was previously required.96
The OAL has rejected regulations because a statement of reasons
was nonexistent, 97 conclusive,98 too general,99 or misleading. 00 With
regard to the notice requirements of A.B. 1111 , regulations have been
rejected because an agency provided inadequate time for public no-
tice '0 1 or failed to provide a substantively adequate notice. For exam-
ple, when an agency attempted to avoid the notice strictures by
enacting "nonsubstantive" changes in its regulations, the OAL found
the proposed changes to be substantive. 0 2
A.B. 1111's statement of reasons requirement could improve the
quality of regulations. Internally, the requirement to state in some de-
tail and in a coherent manner the factual and policy predicates for
agency action should force agency decisionmakers to focus on logical
flaws and policy drawbacks in their proposals and final regulations
prior to publication.103 Externally, the increased information made
available with proposed rules should make agency action more accessi-
ble by making it simpler for interested persons to take positions on
95. Hamilton, Proceduresfor the Adoption of Rules of General Applicability: The Needfor
Procedurallnnovation in-Administrative Ru/emaking, 60 CALIF. L. REv. 1276, 1331 (1972);cf. Alvi-
ani, supra note 2, at 295 (additional procedures may curtail number of regulations proposed or
issued by federal agencies).
96. Compare §§ 11346.5 and 11346.7 (West 1980 & Supp. 1982) with § 11424 (West 1966 &
Supp. 1980).
97. Letter of Dec. 2,1981, to California State University and Colleges, 81 Cal. Admin. Reg.
No. 49-Z (Dec. 5, 1981), at 41, 42.
98. Letter of Sept. 11, 1981, to State Department of Education, 81 Cal. Admin. Reg. No.
37-Z (Sept. 12, 1981), at 24, 25.
99. Letter of Jan. 7,1982, to Department of Food and Agriculture, 82 Cal. Admin. Reg. No.
2-Z (Jan. 9, 1982), at 39, 40.
100. Letter of Jan. 22, 1982, to State Department of Education, 82 Cal. Admin. Reg. No. 5-Z
(Jan. 30, 1982), at 67, 69.
101. Letter of Jan. 13, 1982, to Department of General Services (California State Police), 82
Cal. Admin. Reg. No. 3-Z (Jan. 16, 1982), at 42 (second rejection of same regulations for notice
problems).
102. Letter to the California State University and Colleges, supra note 97, at 41.
Similarly, the OAL disapproved Air Resources Board regulations delaying an emission stan-
dard for one year because the Board had given notice proposing a two-year delay. Letter of Jan.
29, 1982, to Air Resources Board, 82 Cal. Admin. Reg. No. 5-Z (Jan. 30, 1982), at 80, 81-82. An
appeal to the Governor was withdrawn after the regulations were resubmitted to the OAL and
approved on Feb. 19, 1982. 82 Cal. Admin. Reg. No. 8-Z (Feb. 20, 1982), at 44. See generally Is
7his Really Nece=rar,? CAL. REO. L. REP., Summer 1982, at 14.
103. Pedersen, Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE J. 38, 73 (1975); ef
Cooper, supra note 4, at 213 (impact statements focus policymakers' attention but are costly in
time and money).
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proposals and to focus their comments on relevant issues.104 To the
extent that information enables relatively unsophisticated persons to
express their views to the agencies more competently, the statement of
reasons requirement may diminish the imbalance of influence between
well-funded interests represented by counsel or lobbyists, who could
participate effectively without the additional information, and affected
members of the general public.105
2. Final Statement of Reasons and the Response to Comments.
The requirement that the agency's final statement of reasons include
the agency's response to each objection or comment received' °6 should
increase the perception of agency responsiveness to the public, and
meeting this requirement may increase actual agency responsiveness as
well."0o But the requirement's stringency seems designed to drown
104. Wright, Court of Appeals Review of Federal Regulatory Agency Rulemaking, 26 AD. L.
P,Ev. 199, 210-11 (1974).
105. q. Scalia, 7wo Wrongs Make a RiAght, REQ., July-Aug. 1977, at 38, 40 (approving as part
of democratic process giving greater weight to positions of interest groups than to positions of
private citizens). But see ikfra text accompanying notes 266-68.
106. See supra text accompanying note 34.
107. When the OAL disapproves a rule, however, the procedure may negate this increased
agency accountability and responsiveness to the public. The agency may provide the OAL with
additional evidence in support of its resubmitted regulations, notwithstanding the restriction of
OAL review to the record of the rulemaking proceeding. § 11349.1 (West 1980). This material
will be beyond public scrutiny.
For example, after the OAL disapproved regulations of the State Board of Pharmacy increas-
ing licensure fees, the Board's staff prepared new budgetary documents to prove to the OAL why
certain of its licensure fees, rather than others, had to be raised and to demonstrate the need to
maintain a budgetary surplus. These documents were not available to the Board or the public at
the time of the adoption decision. Telephone interview with Claudia Foutz, Executive Secretary,
State Board of Pharmacy (Sept. 8, 1982) (notes on file with author); Letter of Jan. 28, 1981, from
the OAL to the State Board of Pharmacy, at 2.
The procedure followed by the Pharmacy Board to obtain approval of its regulation was
legitimate. "[U]nless the substantive provisions of the regulation have been significantly changed"
the rewritten regulation may be resubmitted without complying with notice and public hearing
requirements. § 11349.4 (West 1980). A new text of a regulation has to be made available to the
public for 15 days prior to its adoption. § 11346.8(c) (West 1980 & Supp. 1981). But often it is not
the regulation that is faulty, but the proof supporting it. The statute allows the OAL to approve a
resubmitted regulation on the basis of information and rationale that were never before the public
for review.
Gene Livingston, former OAL Director, states that nothing can be added to the record with-
out notice and comment, but that the final statement ofreasons is not technically evidence and can
be amended and resubmitted after disapproval. Livingston Interview, supra note 72. The OAL's
current policy as stated by Livingston does not appear to be based on any clear statutory
command.
The impact of section 11349.4 is significant. About twenty percent of disapproved regulations
are resubmitted. Livingston Interview, sxpra note 72. The OAL disapproved 407 sets of regula-
tions during 1980-82. 1981-82 OAL ANNuAL REP. 6.
A solution is problematical, because requiring a new round of notice and hearing is expensive
and time-consuming. But the current procedure would allow an agency purposefully to omit ex-
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agencies in paperwork - and thus to reduce the number of regulations
- rather than to improve the quality of decisionmaking. It is unneces-
sary to treat all objections and comments alike to improve the regula-
tory process.os Abuse of this requirement may snarl agency processes.
Agencies may be required to respond to massive sets of suggestions,
even if the suggestions are absurd.10 9 The original requirement of A.B.
1111 that agencies must respond to "primary considerations" suits the
needs of rational decisionmaking far better than the existing
requirement. 110
The OAL has vigilantly enforced the response to comments re-
quirement. In approximately one-sixth of the sets of regulations re-
jected by the office between January 1, 1982, the date the more
stringent requirement went into effect, and June 9, 1982, the OAL cited
the agency's failure to comply with this requirement as one reason for
rejection."' The OAL insists that "an agency must respond, in the Fi-
nal Statement of Reasons, to each objection." 1 2
The OAL's rejection of regulations promulgated by the California
Health Facilities Commission illustrates the specificity of response
which the OAL requires. Several hospitals objected that the regula-
tions would increase their costs; one hospital stated that the require-
ment would cost $.015 per patient. The Commission's response that
"added costs to hospitals will be minimal and that, 'No Commission
posure of some important justification documents or rationale to public scrutiny, suffer OAL re-
jection, and provide those documents or rationale (or create them) to support resubmission. Some
exposure of significant new justification or data should be mandated. A brief description of the
material and its availability published in the California Administrative Register, with a 15-day
period for receipt of written comment directed only to the ramifications of the new material,
would satisfy the need for public scrutiny without excessive delay and would preclude agency
circumvention of that scrutiny.
108. One proponent of a similar requirement for federal agency rulemaking would require
comments to "meet a standard of detail equal to that required of the agency in promulgating its
rule" before they would be significant enough to trigger an answer by the agency. Pedersen, supra
note 103; at 75-76.
109. The OAL sponsored the amendment to A.B. 1111 that made the final statement require-
ment more stringent. It sought the change to eliminate arguments with agencies about which
considerations were "primary" and needed response. The OAL believes the current language best
serves the dual purposes of assuring good faith consideration of all comments and allowing the
public to understand why its views were not accepted. In the OAL's experience, the same facts
supporting a rule's necessity counter the comments; for the agencies the main difficulty is in deal-
ing with comments that are entirely irrelevant or absurd. Livingston Interview, supra note 72.
110. Even compliance with the requirement of response only to "primary considerations" en-
tails considerable work by the agencies. Letter of Feb. 9, 1981, to Commission for Teacher Prepa-
ration and Licensing, at 1-2. Federal reformers, aiming for the same goal of increased agency
responsiveness to comments, would require no more. See supra note 34.
111. Author's calculation from collected data.
112. Letter of Apr. 7, 1982, to Department of Food and Agriculture, 82 Cal. Admin. Reg. No.
15-Z (Apr. 10, 1982), at 25, 27 (emphasis added).
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action is necessary on this comment,"' was deemed inadequate by the
OAL because it failed to explain the Commission's reason for rejecting
the comment.113
The hospital regulations example illustrates the shortcomings of
requiring utmost specificity in responses to public comment. It would
have been a near-impossible task for the Commission to prove that
$.015 is minimal. If agencies are forced to utilize cost-benefit analysis
to justify disagreements with commentors, the response requirement,
which was intended to increase agency responsiveness, will become a
substantive, outcome-determinative requirement.1 14 The necessity cri-
terion, not the response to comments requirement, should test the un-
derlying validity of the regulation. In its response to comments the
agency should only have to express its reasons for its choices, not prove
their cogency.
This criticism is directed solely at the all-encompassing nature of
the response requirement and the stringency of its enforcement. Other
OAL rejections based in part on violation of the response to comments
rule are entirely justified."15 At a certain point, however, process re-
forms produce paperwork and little else of actual or perceived value." 16
Requiring and enforcing agency responsiveness is an excellent goal, but
the California statute requires too much and should be redrafted. The
redrafted statute should instruct the OAL to require only a good faith
response by agencies to the most important criticisms of their
proposals." 7
113. Letter of Apr. 9,1982, to California Health Facilities Commission, 82 Cal. Admin. Reg.
No. 16-Z (Apr. 17, 1982), at 34, 36;seeaso letter of Dec. 10, 1981, to Department of Corporations,
81 Cal. Admin. Reg. No. 50-Z (Dec. 12, 1981), at 20, 21.
114. See also letter of Aug. 6, 1981, to CAL/OSHA Standards Board, 81 Cal. Admin. Reg.
No. 32-Z (Aug. 12, 1981), at 29.
115. Letter of Jan. 15,1982, to Department of Food and Agriculture, 82 Cal. Admin. Reg. No.
4-Z (Jan. 23, 1982), at 54, 56; Letter of Feb. 23, 1981, to State Lands Commission, at 1.
116. C. Cooper, supra note 4, at 212-13 (impact statements divert agency resources from other
goals).
117. A model for redrafting might be the federal Administrative Procedure Act, which re-
quires publication of a "concise general statement of [a rules] basis and purpose," 5 U.S.C.
§ 553(c) (1976). The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit interpreted this provi-
sion as follows:
We do not expect the agency to discuss every item of fact or opinion included in the
submissions made to it in informal rulemaking. We do expect that [the required state-
ment] will enable us to see what major issues of policy were ventilated by the informal
proceedings and why the agency reacted to them as it did.
Automotive Parts & Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1968). See generally
Pedersen, supra note 103, at 73 (degree of detail required in supporting documents much greater
than APA suggests); Wright, supra note 104, at 209 & n.35 (concise general statements should
serve as serious substantive support for rules); Note, Rethinng Regulatiorn Negotiation as an
Alternative to 7Jad tonaI/demazking, 94 HAnv. L REv. 1871, 1885 & nn.77-80 (1981).
Vol 1983".2311
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3. The Right to a Hearing. From a practical perspective, the
newly created right to an oral hearing 18 could measurably affect
agency efficiency in rulemaking. From a theoretical point of view, this
requirement represents a major break from the tradition of informal
rulemaking by notice-and-comment. 19
Some state agencies, especially the boards responsible for occupa-
tional licensure, have customarily held public hearings prior to the
adoption of rules.120 These hearings satisfied rulemaking requirements
while simultaneously providing a forum for communication with the
regulated. Licensing boards, however, have narrow responsibilities
and well-defined constituencies. The efficiency of major state agencies
with diffuse responsibilities and lengthy and complex rules121 could be
considerably impaired if a single petitioner can force a public hearing
every time the agency makes a minor regulatory adjustment. Under
the new law a single person or group can disrupt agency functioning by
burdening it with unnecessary public hearings. On the positive side a
group that needs a public hearing to present its views effectively can
require a hearing. Under prior law it would not have been able to de-
mand one.12
Statutory modification could retain the advantages of the provi-
sion while preventing its abuse. The right to an oral hearing could be
limited to those regulatory actions that would have a significant impact
on the public, the state, or the regulated group. Significance could be
defined, for example, in terms of the number of affected parties, or the
financial, competitive and public welfare implications of the action.
Federal precedents in defining "major" or "significant" rules would of-
fer a useful starting point.' 3
118. The relevant language, in Government Code sections 11346.5 (a)(9) and 11346.8 (West
1980 & Supp. 1982), was added to the law by 1981 Cal. Stat. 865 § 251, effective January 1, 1982;
its impact is thus not yet obvious.
119. K. DAvis, supra note 30, at § 6.01; Scalia, supra note 105, at 39-40.
120. Telephone Interview with Richard B. Spohn, Director, Department of Consumer Affairs
[California], Sept. 7, 1982 (notes on file with author); jf Scalia, supra note 105, at 39 ("most
agencies frequently hold public hearings on rules of major impact").
121. An example is the California Department of Health Services, which administers a wide
variety of programs and had 2,000 pages of rules in 1982.
122. Cf Hamilton, .rtra note 95, at 1330 (oral presentations enable more forceful and persua-
sive advocacy than written comments). Hamilton criticizes the formal rulemaking process, finding
it workable only when narrowly defined factual issues are involved. Id at 1312-13. He nonethe-
less favors the incorporation into notice-and-comment rulemaking of many of the process modifi-
cations mandated by A.B. 1111, such as oral hearings, explanations of rejection of comments, and
formalization of the record. .d at 1332-36.
123. See .mpra note 26. Federal reform efforts encourage oral hearings, but mandate them
only for major regulations. The Senate legislation has taken a giant step beyond the bare oral
hearings requirement, however, in requiring, where necessary to resolve "significant issues of
[Vol. 1983:231
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4. The Rulemaking File. Of all the procedural modifications of
the A.B. 1111 reform package, the sections that define the rulemaking
file' 24 and denominate it as the record for OAL and court review' 25
most reflect the "progressive judicialization of the rulemaking pro-
cess" 12 6 that has been evident throughout the last decade of regulatory
reform. Courts, uncomfortable with having to review the typically un-
tidy rulemaking record, have pressed for formalization of the rulemak-
ing process.127
The rulemaking file requirement gives no direct instruction to the
agencies. Agencies must, however, have their regulations approved by
the OAL and, if challenged, by the courts. Because the statute requires
that agencies prove necessity to the OAL's satisfaction on the basis of
the rulemaking file alone, 28 the rulemaking file is essentially an exclu-
sive record. Whether the statute. requires that the rulemaking file be
the exclusive record for judicial review of the agency's conclusion that
a regulation is necessary 29 is, however, unclear.
By making the rulemaking file the exclusive record for review, at
least by the OAL, the rulemaking file requirement should promote
agency accountability and accessibility.1 30 Interested persons and re-
fact," the "opportunity for direct and cross-examination of the principal agency employees...
who prepared. . . data on which the agency substantially relied" as well as of other persons who
present testimony at the hearings. S. 1080, supra note 2, at S2714. The implications of this re-
quirement, in terms of delay and formalization, are significant. This one provision could essen-
tially erase for affected rules the distinction between formal and informal rulemaking procedures.
124. §§ 11347.3, 11350(b) (West 1980 & Supp. 1982).
125. Id § 11350(b).
126. Scalia, supra note 105, at 38.
127. See eg. Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467,475-76 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Texas
v. EPA, 499 F.2d 289, 308 n-31; (5th Cir. 1974) California Optometric Ass'n v. Lackner, 60 Cal.
App. 3d 500, 510-11, 131 Cal. Rptr. 744, 751-52 (1976); see also Wright, New JudicialRequnitesfor
Informal ulemaking: Implications for the Environmental Impact Statement Process, 29 AD. L.
REV. 59, 61-62 (1977) (author is Circuit Judge J. Skelly Wright). Pedersen's thoughtful analysis
concludes that informal rulemaking procedures, especially the unstructured record, "provide
neither a satisfactory framework for agency decisionmaking nor a structure to those decisions that
would ease judicial review.... If rules ... were based on clearly defined records, the efficiency
of both rulemaking and judicial review would be increased." Pedersen, supra note 103, at 39.
Pedersen argues for a clearly defined, exclusive record for rulemaking. Id at 78-82 &passim. He
agrees, however, with other commentators who fear excessive formalization of rulemaking proce-
dures. Id at 44; see Hamilton, supra note 95, at 1312-13; Scalia, supra note 105, at 40-41.
128. § 11349.1 (West 1980 & Supp. 1982).
129. Cf § 11350(b) (West 1980 & Supp. 1982) ("[a] regulation may be declared invalid if the
court cannot find that the record of the rulemaking proceeding supports the agency's determina-
tion that the regulation is reasonably necessary to effectuate the purpose of the statute. .. ").
130. Due process may also mandate that reviewers of agency processes have access to all in-
formation available to the decisionmakers. Auerbach, supra note 36, at 40, Nathanson, Probing
the Mind of the Adbnstrator Hearing Variations and Standard of Judicial Review Under the
Admnstrative Procedure Act and Other Federal Statutes, 75 CoLuM. L REv. 721, 757-58 (1975).
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viewers will be better able to comment on, and perhaps to contradict,
the bases of agency decisions.
Outweighing these advantages, however, are the troublesome
ramifications of "closed record" rulemaking. First, the closed record
requirement will be costly. Agencies will have to expend considerable
time and energy defining the record. 131 Second, and more importantly,
the requirement places unprecedented discretion in the OAL and, to a
lesser extent, in the judiciary.132 Although good government may re-
quire that reviewers of agency processes have access to all the informa-
tion available to agency decisionmakers, it is not necessarily true that
good government demands that regulatory decisionmakers issue rules
solely on the basis of that information.1 33 The creation of good public
policy as embodied in generally applicable rules requires more than a
technocratic sifting of data.'3 Administrative agencies were created in
part to allow delineation of policy by specially qualified individuals -
that is, experts. 135 But the closed record typical of a trial court or an
administrative adjudication leaves no room for applying expertise or
making policy judgments: a decision not wholly supported by evidence
in the record will be reversed on review. Thus, particularly in scientific
and technical areas in which the agency is operating on the frontiers of
available knowledge, the closed record requirement may stifle agency
expertise and judgment because decisionmakers may not be able to
131. These bureaucratic costs include preparing papers reflecting agency expertise for inclu-
sion in the rulemaking file and the delay that will result when decisionmakers do not know in
advance what influences not in the record will inform their judgment, and are forced to repeat
notice and comment cycles.
132. The "closed" record requirement may have a disproportionate negative impact on the
ability of the least sophisticated to participate effectively in rulemaking proceedings. Pedersen,
supra note 103, at 79-80 n.150; see infra text accompanying notes 266-68.
133. Other reformers have recognized this point. The Regulatory Reform Act would establish
a rulemaking fie requirement, and that file would constitute the record for judicial review. A rule
would be arbitrary if itsfaclual harsi were without substantial support in that file. S. 1080, supra
note 2, at S2713, 2714, 2717. The 1981 Model State Administrative Procedure Act (MSAPA) pro-
vides that the "rle-making record need not constitute the exclusive basis for agency action on
that rule," as long as "only those particular reasons on which the agency relied in its concise
explanatory statement [are] used as justifications for adoption of that rule." Bonflield, supra note 3,
at 10, (discussing 1981 MSAPA §§ 3-112(c) and 3-110(b)) (emphasis in original).
134. Scalia, supra note 105, at 40; Cf Cooper, supra note 4, at 200 (not all governmental deci-
sions are suitable for review on a record). Elsewhere Scalia argues that "[fnor the agencies to
produce politically sound rules ... ItIhe rulemaking process itself must permit the play of polit-
ical forces that enables an intelligent political judgment to be formed" and "the standard of review
[must] leave... room for politicaljudgment." ulemakng as Polilics (Chairman's Message), 34
AD. L. Rav. v, ix (1982).
135. Angel v. Butz, 487 F.2d 260, 262-63 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. dented, 417 U.S. 967 (1974);
General TeL Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 846, 862 (5th Cir. 1971); Wright, supra note 104, at
211.
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supply facts in the file to support the necessity of their decisions.1 36
This is unfortunate. Since agencies often must set standards in the ab-
sence of sound data,137 they must be accorded some latitude for making
reasoned judgments under such circumstances. 38
A modification of the current statute that maintains the closed rec-
ord but requires limited recognition of agency judgment and expertise
in appropriate circumstances could increase agency accessibility with-
out eliminating all deference to agency expertise. 39 Such a modifica-
tion should provide that expertise shall not take the place of facts that
were reasonably obtainable but are not in the record. 40 The modifica-
tion should also provide that deference shall not be given to agency
experience that could have been explained in the record, but was not.
Expertise should be recognized as legitimate when it involves the as-
136. Agencies of course have the option of introducing materials into the record that ostensi-
bly reflect their expertise or justify appropriate results. See Letter of Apr. 2, 1981, to California
Highway Patrol, at 2 ("Specific facts derived from the CHPs own experience and expertise...
would satisfy this requirement"); Letter of May 18, 1981, to Department of Real Estate, at 2 ("we
would assume that a factual basis for its development of these new regulations... is to be found
in its experience...and that the Department may explain the need. . ."); Letter of Jan. 15, 1981,
to Governor Brown, at 2 ("agency members should see to it that information which is available to
them as individuals and which is relevant to a specific item before them is placed in the rulemak-
ing file in a form which is accessible to the public.").
137. See, eg., Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 37-38 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cet denied, 426
U.S. 941 (1976); Reserve Mining v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 519 (8th Cir. 1975).
138. A parallel critique may apply to federal reform proposals. The Senate has adopted the
rulemaking file language of the California statute, see .supra note 133, and denominated that file as
the record for judicial review. Whether it would be the exclusive record is unclear, if so, it suffers
from the same problem as the California provision. S. 1080, supra note 2 at S2714. The report
accompanying S. 1080 fails to resolve the ambiguity. See S. REP. No. 284, 97th Cong., ist Sess.
(Star Print) 132-33, 165. The Senate bill may, however, include the benefits of the rulemaking file
without its disadvantages. The judicial review section of the bill refers to the rulemaking file, in
contrast to the record, just once, in the context of the court's determination whether the factual
basis of a rule has substantial support in that file. 128 CONG. REc. S2716 (daily ed. March 24,
1982). The rulemaking file may be intended to be exclusive only with respect to finding support
for a rule's factual basis, which is far more limited than in the California reform package.
139. The increased accessibility of decisionmaking may be illusory. Access to participation in
governmental processes, even in informal rulemaking, is not universal. A certain level of sophisti-
cation is required to make one's views known to agencies contemplating rule changes. If the
rulemaking file, which is disproportionately influenced by sophisticated interests, is exclusive, and
it requires effort by the agency in the absence of other input to add conflicting views to that file,
the agency is less likely to reach a sustainable policy choice favorable to the unrepresented. Cf.
Greenberger, A Conswner Advocate's Arew of the FDA's Procedures and Practices, 32 FOOD DRUG
Cosm LJ. 293, 295-96 (1977) (consumer representatives may lack information necessary to recog-
nize issues they should address); Livingston, Organizations andAdmintrative Practice-A Baance
to the Corporate State? 26 HASTINGS LJ. 89, 107 (1974); Noll, upra note 87, at 687-88; Comment,
lheAgencyfor ConsumerAdvocacy, 26 Am. U.L. REv. 1062, 1062 & nn. 3-5; Note, supra note 117,
at 1879 & n. 46.
140. "[P]retensions of expertise unsupported by the record" should not alone support a rule.
Wngnt, .wpra note 127, at 62.
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sessment and interpretation of facts (or lack of facts), or the reasoned
and explained choice 141 among facts supported by the record, or the
rejection of those facts.' 42 To the extent that judgment will determine
the agency's view of a particular rule's necessity, the OAL should defer
to that judgment and accordingly demand support in the rulemaking
file only for the facts informing that judgment. 43 The rulemaking file
requirement - which appears to be only a procedural change - is an
inappropriate vehicle to eliminate deference to agency policy
choices. 144
5. Emergency Adoption of Regulations. The grant of oversight
powers to OAL over emergency adoption of regulations has already
had a dramatic and salutary effect on a chronic problem. Some agen-
cies have habitually abused emergency rulemaking procedures. One
agency adopted a regulation as an emergency provision several times in
a row. 145 Such abuse had to be remedied because emergency adoptions
are inaccessible to the general public; only those who closely follow an
agency's activities may be aware of its intentions, and even they have
no formal mechanism to influence "emergency" regulations. 46 During
141. Reasoning and explanation must occur prior to or simultaneous with adoption of the
rule, and not simply as apost hoc rationalization. C. Burlington Truck Lines v. United States,
371 U.S. 156, 168-69 (1962) (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 32 U.S. 184, 196 (1947)) (court must
judge propriety of agency action "solely on the grounds invoked by the agency").
142. But see Robinson, The Makfng of Ad.ninistrative Policy: Another Look at Rulemaking and
Adjudication andAdministrative Procedure Reform, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 485, 519-20 (1970) ("we
have not suffered from too little faith in and reliance on expert wisdom.... Expertise all too
often means narrowmindedness").
143. S. 1080's judicial review provisions recognize just such a distinction between the factual
basis for a rule and its policy basis; the bill requires substantial support in the rulemaking file only
for the former. See supra notes 133, 138; see S. 1080 supra note 2, at S2718. See DeLong, supra
note 36, at 290-93.
144. Drastic change in the level of deference to be accorded agency judgment was urged in the
United States Congress in the form of the Bumpers Amendment. That amendment would have
modified the judicial review sections of the federal APA. Its critical language, as passed by the
Senate in 1979, provided in pertinent part as follows:
There shall be no presumption that any rule or regulation of any agency is valid, and
whenever the validity of any such rule or regulation is drawn in question m any court of
the United States or of any State, the court shall not uphold the validity of such chal-
lenged rule or regulation unless such validity is established by a preponderance of the
evidence shown.
125 CONG. Rc. S12145 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1979). See Bliss, supra note 2, at 640-43; Kennedy, The
Bwnpers Amendment: Regulating the Regulators, 67 A.B.A. J. 1639 (1981). This language was
significantly amended in the Regulatory Reform Act. S. 1080, supra note 2, at S2713. 1982
Amendments to the California APA provisions on standards for review of agency action some-
what limit deference to agency judgment. See infra text accompanying notes 223-28.
145. See California Ass'n of Nursing Homes v. Williams, 4 Cal. App. 3d 800, 812, 84 Cal.
Rptr. 590, 597-98 (1970).
146. Informal channels may be open; agencies also may allow selective participation.
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the OAL's first two years of operation, agencies requested approval of
120 and 105 sets of emergency regulations, respectively. 147 This com-
pares favorably to the 232 filed the previous year. The OAL disap-
proved 67 of those filings during its first two years 148 as not "necessary
for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety or
general welfare." 14 9
The QAL's denials of agency requests for "emergency" rule ap-
provals are, on the whole, laudable. For example, the OAL has denied
emergency status to regulations changing the "coupling" of horses as a
single wagering interest; 150 expanding the authorized size of cauliflower
containers;151 and increasing the assessments for the California Beef
Council. 152 In contrast, the OAL has approved emergency status for
such purposes as expanding quarantine areas to prevent the spread of
infestations, to suspend pesticide~application permits and to deal with
harvest situations in which delay "immediately threatened harvests,
markets and employment."1 53 The OAL has also appropriately refused
to allow agencies to use emergency procedures when the emergency is
of their own creation - when the agency had adequate time to follow
normal rulemaking procedures but failed to plan so that it could meet
deadlines.lM The OAL has also consistently refused to recognize
147. 1981-82 OAL ANNUAL REP. 9.
148. Id
149. § 11346.1(b) (West 1980). The Governor was apparently powerless to review these disap-
provals until a statutory change allowed him to overrule "a decision refusing to allow the readop-
tion of an emergency regulation." § 11349.5 (West 1980), as amendedby 1980 Cal. Stat. 1238 § 5;
cf Internal Government Review of Agencies, CAL- REG. L. REP., Winter 1982, at 14, 15-16;
Cluchette v. Brown, L.A. Sup. Ct., No. C384208, Oct. 16, 1981, cited in CAL REG. L. REP., Winter
1982, at 16.
150. Letter of Aug. 12, 1981, to California Horse Racing Board, 81 Cal. Admin. Reg. No. 33-
Z (Aug. 15, 1981), at 27-28.
151. Letter of Mar. 30, 1982, to Department of Food and Agriculture, 82 Cal. Admin. Reg.
No. 14-Z (Apr. 3, 1982), at 42. The Department of Food and Agriculture readopted the same
regulations as an emergency measure in May 1982, and once again OAL ordered their repeal.
This time OAL explained that "while the increase in container size has been shown to be generally
necessary, this amendment cannot be justified as an emergency .... While the facts presented
support a non-emergency amendment, they do not present the type of crisis situation which neces-
sitates regulatory action without notice or public hearing." OAL also noted that during the time
the Department delayed its resubmission of the regulation as an emergency, it could have adopted
the amendments by regular adoption procedures. Letter of May 14, 1982, to Department of Food
and Agriculture, 82 Cal. Admin Reg. No. 21-Z (May 22, 1982), at B-7, B-8, B-9.
152. Letter of Apr. 16, 1982, to Department of Food and Agriculture, 82 Cal. Admin. Reg. No.
16-Z (Apr. 17, 1982), at 41.
153. Id
154. Letter of Apr. 29,1982, to Department of Health Services, 82 Cal. Admin. Reg. No. 18-Z
(May 1, 1982), at 30. Letter of Nov. 30, 1981, to Assistant State Treasurer (California Industrial
Development Financing Advisory Commission), 81 Cal. Admin. Reg. No. 49-Z (Dec. 5, 1981), at
Vol. 1983".231]
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agency budgetary woes as a rationale for emergency rulemaking. 155
This interpretation of its statutory mandate is quite sound, and has re-
ceived implicit approval from the legislature.1 56
The legislature has confirmed the OAL's view that agencies cannot
justify using emergency rulemaking procedures solely on the ground
that the legislation being implemented contains an urgency clause.1 57
The legislature inserts urgency clauses not only to afford certain stat-
utes an earlier effective date than January 1 of the succeeding year, but
also to circumvent various internal legislative deadlines.' 58 Thus, the
urgency clause does not always reflect legislative concern for immedi-
acy. Nor does the need to adopt a statute quickly always imply that
implementing regulations are needed quickly as well.
The OAL's tough stance is effectively and appropriately eliminat-
ing agency abuse of the emergency adoption procedure. Eliminating
this abuse has led to major gains in agency accountability and public
responsiveness.
6. Clarity. The requirement that OAL review submissions for
clarity is uncontroversial. 159 Although agencies and commentators
may complain that the OAL does not have the expertise necessary to
make some of the judgments entrusted to it, 160 that very lack of special
expertise makes it an appropriate reviewer for clarity. If the OAL's
39; Letter of Oct. 2, 1981, to Department of Justice, 81 Cal. Admin. Reg. No. 41-Z (Oct. 10, 1981),
at 44, 45.
155. Letter of Oct. 16, 1981, to Commission for Teacher Preparation and Licensing, 81 Cal.
Admin. Reg. No. 42-Z (Oct. 17, 1981), at 36; Letter of Sept. 14, 1981, to Department of Water
Resources, 81 CaL Admin. Reg. No. 37-Z (Sept. 12, 1981), at 30.
156. In October and December 1980, the OAL rejected regulations of the Department of So-
cial Services (DSS) that would have eliminated welfare fair hearings when grants were adjusted in
accordance with statutory changes because welfare recipients could not prevail at such hearings.
DSS based its emergency filing on the costs to the state of providing hearings and of paying
welfare benefits at existing levels until the hearings were completed. The OAL said that DSS's
view of the expected number of hearings was "speculative" and that the agency's problem was
self-created because DSS knew of the legislative change requiring the grant adjustments since July
1980. In response to the OAL's disapproval, a bill was introduced in the legislature on December
1, 1980, to eliminate the right to fair hearings when automatic adjustments to welfare grants are
authorized by law. The bill passed both houses and was signed and chaptered by the Governor on
December 4, 1980. Price, supra note 14, at 17-19. The legislature was undoubtedly motivated to
quick action by the expense to the State of providing meaningless hearings. It directed its action
solely toward DSS's problem, however, and expressed no displeasure with the OAL's general
stance in regard to emergency regulations.
157. In 1981, the legislature amended section 11346.1 to add, "The enactment of an urgency
statute shall not, in and of itself, constitute a need for immediate action." 1981 Cal. Stat. 865 § 22.
158. Cf. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 8(c); Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 13 (amended in As-
sembly Mar. 23, 1983) (Temporary Joint Rules 61(g)).
159. See, ,,g., Is 7his Realy Necessary?, supra note 102, at 14.
160. See, ag., OAL, A Red Tape Hydra? CAL. REG. L. REP., Fall 1981, at 5.
[Vol. 1983:231
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staff considers a regulation unclear, persons directly affected by the reg-
ulation are also likely to find it difficult to understand. The OAL and
the promulgating agency then may negotiate what the agency must do
to satisfy the clarity requirement. A change in wording often satisfies
the OAL that the meaning of a regulation will be clear to the public.
161
The clarity requirement encompasses a variety of other problems
in regulations in addition to inappropriate word choice. These include
unclear references in tables;162 general references to standards, policies,
or requirements not spelled out in the regulation; 63 and incorporation
by reference of material that can be changed by someone other than the
adopting agency.164 Similarly, the OAL has used the clarity criterion to
require adoption within rules of material that would otherwise be
found only in staff manuals and other documents not subject to the
rulemaking process.165
The OAL's expansive use of the clarity criterion exceeds the origi-
nal legislative intention to substitute plain English for legalese.' 66 The
OAL's position, however, reflects a legitimate concern that true under-
standing of agency policies requires that those policies be exposed in
161. Livingston Interview, supra note 72.
The most publicized OAL disapproval for lack of clarity was the rejection of the following
language concerning the operation of fork lifts when workers are standing on the lifting platform:
"Before elevating personnel, make sure that the mast is vertical in a sideways direction as well as
forward and rearward." Letter of Dec. 26, 1981, to Occupational Safety and Health Standards
Board, at I. The OAL suggested the following rewording of the section: "Before elevating per-
sonnel, make sure that the mast is vertical and/or the platform is leveL" Id at 2. See also Letter
of Aug. 18, 1980, to State Athletic Commission, objecting to the following language in regulations
concerning pension and disability funds for boxers: "If the covered boxer is alive on the date of
his retirement, actuarially reduced monthly payments will be made to him as long as he lives."
Price, supra note 14, at 7 n.7. See also Letter of May 3, 1982, to Department of Health Services, 82
Cal. Admin. Reg. No. 20-Z (May 15, 1982), at B-5, B-7.
162. Letter of Nov. 25, 1981, to Bureau of Automotive Repair, 81 Cal. Admin. Reg. No. 49-Z
(Dec. 5, 1981), at 36, 37.
163. Letter of Sept. 11, 1981, to California State University and Colleges, 81 Cal. Admin. Reg.
No. 37-Z (Sept. 12, 1981), at 29. This disapproval was appealed to the Governor, who upheld the
OAL's determination for a different reason. OAL Appeal Docket No. 81 OAL 7 (on file with
author).
164. Letter of Sept. 11, 1981, to California Highway Patrol, 81 Cal. Admin. Reg. No. 37-Z
(Sept. 12, 1981), at 27, 28.
165. The OAL's position is in accordance with the California Supreme Court's decision in
Armistead v. State Personnel Bd., 22 Cal. 3d'198, 583 P.2d 744, 149 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1978).
166. The early drafts of A.B. 1111 defined clarity as "written or displayed so that the meaning
of regulations will be easily understood by an interested person of average intelligence who is
somewhat familiar with the subject." A.B. 1111, 1979 Regular Sess., as amended May 16, 1979,
§ 11349(c) (West 1980). The bill was amended for fear that it would preclude appropriate use of
language familiar to specialists in a regulated field. Starr, supra note 14, at 721 & n.68.
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their entirety to public scrutiny. The OAL's expanded use of clarity is
commendable and should be supported. 167
7. General Aeflections on Procedural Changes. The procedural
changes that A.B. 1111 made in California's informal rulemaking pro-
cess reflect the evolution in the relationship between the citizen and
government. When the federal and state Administrative Procedure
Acts were initially adopted in the 1940s,168 the government influenced
citizens' daily lives considerably less than it does now. 169 To check this
increasing influence, citizens have sought and obtained increased pub-
lic access to government operations. 170 California's procedural reforms
apply this trend toward increased review to the rulemaking process.
These reforms have in some particulars exceeded reasonable
boundaries. The most notable excesses are the response to comments
and oral hearing requirements. Ironically, the response to comments
requirement reflects a "command and control"' 7 ' mentality that is
much despised in regulators. The original requirement in A.B. 1111
struck a better balance between external control and self-control and is
preferable to the present requirement. Although the superseded re-
quirement contained a troublesome point - the meaning of "primary
considerations" 17 2- the OAL could easily remedy that problem by ed-
ucating the agencies with disapproval letters. The economist's objec-
tion is appropriate here: added procedures may make the system so
complex and bureaucratic that their marginal benefits exceed their
marginal costs. The legislature should review California's reforms with
an eye to such considerations.
167. Legislation sponsored by the OAL in 1982, to be effective January 1, 1983, deals directly
with this problem area by forbidding agencies from enforcing guidelines, bulletins, manuals, or
instructions that are regulations as defined in the APA without use of rulemaking procedures.
1982 Cal. Stat. 61. This new statute is merely declaratory of existing court decisions.
168. The federal Administrative Procedure Act was adopted in 1946; the California Adminis-
trative Procedure Act was adopted in 1947.
169. Starr, supra note 14, at 713-14.
170. See supra note 4.
Agency responsiveness to the demands-real or perceived-of public pressure may not al-
ways be beneficial. Legislators often delegate tasks to administrative agencies to avoid making
politically unpopular but necessary decisions. The politics of single-issue pressure groups may
well exacerbate the need for such delegation. An agency that must adopt politically sensitive
regulations would probably prefer to do so by using traditional notice and comment procedures,
which afford no opportunity for direct confrontation. The increased pablic scrutiny and opportu-
nity for confrontation provided in California's new rulemaking procedures may encourage agen-
cies to respond in a political fashion, as do legislators. Such a result would be unfortunate. It is
important that administrative agencies remain somewhat sheltered from the extent, if not the type,
of direct pressures that operate on a legislature.
171. Cf DeMuth, supra note 4, at 23 (federal regulatory review programs establish engineer-
ing standard of cost-analysis preparation rather than performance standard).
172. § 11346.7 (West 1980). See supra note 109.
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Although control of the rulemaking record has its benefits, a
closed record is too narrow to be the exclusive basis for review of poli-
cymaking. It is appropriate to demand that the factual foundations for
agency policy choices be reflected in that record.1 73 The present stat-
ute, however, fails to distinguish factual premises from policy choices.
The closed record requirement should be amended or interpreted to
limit its applicability to the factual premises of agency rules.
In addition, the increased formality in process that the procedural
changes have effected may actually disadvantage unsophisticated and
unrepresented interested groups, and ultimately increase the imbalance
in access to government.17 4 Public policy choices could be skewed as a
result.
A useful side effect of the new processes may well be a diminution
in judicial review.175 The OAL's.oversight of agency compliance with
rulemaking procedures prevents the filing of regulations with serious
procedural defects, reducing procedural challenges in the courts.
Whether the procedural changes have improved the overall quali-
ty of regulations may be undeterminable.17 6 Undoubtedly, however,
the rulemaking process itself has been measurably improved. The need
to face squarely the issues raised in one's proposals, to frame rationales,
and to respond to public criticisms all improve the quality of the
agency thinking that shapes the regulations. The trap into which the
California reformers are falling in their pursuit of improved procedures
is excessive formalizing of the policymaking task.177 If the reformers
seek ultimately to control agency discretion - to control agency policy
choices - procedural changes are an inappropriate and inefficient
means to that end. Procedures may shape the exercise of discretion,
but procedural solutions should solve procedural problems rather than
substitute for frank controls on the substance of agency policy choices.
Nor should substance control be disguised in procedural clothing. 17
173. See supra text accompanying notes 139-42.
174. See supra note 132; infra text accompanying notes 266-68.
175. Statistics concerning judicial challenges to final federal regulations after the adoption of
the Reagan Order, supra note 26, suggest that this result is likely. The White House claims that a
percentage decline in court cases that is much greater than the percentage decline in final regula-
tions issued reflects the improvements in regulations promulgated: "under the Executive Order,
new regulations have generally been better reasoned [and] more empirically solid." ExEcuTivE
OFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB, EXECUTIVE ORDER 12291 ON FEDA.. REGULATION: PRO-
GREss DURING 1981 6-7 (Apr. 23, 1982).
176. Many other factors could intervene to improve regulations other than the reforms of A.B.
I 111. Miller, supra note 24, at 17.
177. Hamilton, supra note 95, at 1311-13.
178. Pierce and Shapiro, .- pra note 2, at 1179.
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Narrower grants of discretionary power and straightforward substance
review are far more effective avenues to control policy choices. 179
B. Substance Control and its Implications..
1. Authority, Consistency, and Reference. Legal Review. When
the OAL determines whether regulations meet the statutory criteria of
authority, 180 consistency, 18' and reference, 8 2 it engages in an essen-
179. See infra text accompanying notes 280-83.
180. Authority may be express or implied. § 161, PROPOSED REGULATIONS, supra note 61, at
A-6.
181. The consistency standard is broad. A regulation may be inconsistent with the authorizing
statute. Letter of Dec. 18, 1980, to Contractors State License Board, at 2; see also Letter of Mar.
26, 1981, to Board of Forestry, at 2. A regulation also may be inconsistent with procedural stat-
utes, Letter of Feb. 1, 1982, to Department of Health Services, 82 Cal. Admin. Reg. No. 5-Z (Jan.
30, 1982), at 86-87; substantive statutes, Letter of June 7, 1982, to California Department of Jus-
tice, 82 Cal. Admin. Reg. No. 24-Z (June 12, 1982), at B-10 to B-I 1; or judicial interpretations of
statutes, Letter of Feb. 1, 1982, to Department of Health Services, supra.
The OAL also interprets the consistency standard to include consistency with the federal and
state constitutions. PROPOSED REGULATIONS, supra note 61, § 163, at A-6. The OAL has disap-
proved regulations for inconsistency with decisions of the United States Supreme Court on proce-
dural due process, Letter of July 24, 1981, to California Horse Racing Board, 81 Cal. Admin. Reg.
No. 31-Z (Aug. 1, 1981), at 31; and on freedom ofspeech, Letter of June 5, 1981, to Department of
General Services, at 2; S(.Letter of July 30, 1981, to State Athletic Commission, 81 Cal. Admin.
Reg. No. 31-Z (Aug. 1, 1981), at 35 (disapproval based on "chilling effect on speech and
expression").
The OAL's declarations of inconsistency with the United States Constitution raise the issue of
the following prohibition in the California Constitution:
An administrative agency... has no power (a) To declare a statute unenforceable, or
refuse to enforce a statute, on the basis of it being unconstitutional unless an appellate
court has made a determination that such statute is unconstitutional; (b) To declare a
statute unconstitutional; (c) To declare a statute unenforceable, or to refuse to enforce a
statute on the basis that federal law or federal regulations prohibit the enforcement of
such statute unless an appellate court has made a determination that the enforcement of
such statute is prohibited by federal law or federal regulations.
CAL. CONST. art. III, § 3.5. The OAL's authority, of course, is over regulations and not statutes.
In adopting regulations, however, agencies are enforcing their organic statutes. As an administra-
tive agency itself, the OAL should, in the absence of a court determination, refrain from taking
action on the basis of the unconstitutionality of a statute or on the basis that a regulation enforcing
a statute conflicts with federal law.
This limitation on the OAL's power is unfortunate; the problem lies in the constitutional
provision itself. Although denying administrative agencies the power to declare statutes unconsti-
tutional is appropriate public policy and a proper reflection of separation of powers, section 3.5
goes beyond forbidding such declarations. It also forbids agency refusals to act on the grounds of
unconstitutionality or preemption. Thus an agency that decides that it should not adopt or modify
proposed regulations solely because of a constitutional or preemption problem emanating from
the underlying statute faces a Hobson's choice: the agency can either state that reason for not
adopting or modifying the regulations and disregard the constitutional provision, or provide a
false justification in its final statement of reasons and disregard its obligations to the public and
the OAL.
No case has discussed the applicability of section 3.5 to agency rulemaking. The OAL
should, however, take cognizance of this provision when testing agency actions for consistency.
182. The reference requirement is actually procedural in nature. It is included in this section,
however, because it is very similar to authority and consistency. All three standards represent the
[Vol. 1983:231
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tially legal task. Although the requirement of a statement of the au-
thority for adopting regulations is procedural 18 3 a lack of such
authority, or a conflict between the regulation and superior legal au-
thority, is a substantive flaw that renders the regulation invalid.
Unauthorized regulations have always been invalid. 18 4 Previ-
ously, however, a declaration of invalidity has always required a court
challenge, either by pre-enforcement judicial review or by assertion of
the regulation's invalidity in an enforcement proceeding. As a result,
individuals and businesses often conformed their behavior to invalid
regulations because they could not afford the costs of such a challenge.
Now, however, the QAL's review for authority and consistency pro-
vides a test of a regulation's fundamental validity prior to its adoption,
at no direct cost to the regulated. Because agencies may well overstep
their authority in the zealous pursuit of their statutory missions, the
authority standard is beneficial.185
However, the OAL's objections can also preclude agencies from
adopting regulations that are in fact authorized. 8 6 And, because agen-
legislature's attempt to assure the legality of the agency's regulatory action. The OAL considers
the reference requirement to be essentially bibliographic. Letter of Jan. 28, 1981, to California
Coastal Commission, at 4.
183. The OAL sometimes finds that an agency's claimed authority is inaccurate, but that the
agency does have adequate authority that it has failed to cite. See Letter of Feb. 11, 1982, to
Department of Education, 82 Cal. Admin. Reg. No. 8-Z (Feb. 20, 1982), at 40, Letter of Sept. 4,
1981, to Division of Industrial Accidents, 81 Cal. Admin. Reg. No. 36-Z (Sept. 5, 1981), at 52-53
(miscited authority and reference).
184. See anpra note 45 and accompanying text.
185. For example, the Fish and Game Commission, which is authorized to protect "rare or
endangered birds, mammals, fish, amphibia or reptiles," CAL. FISH & GAME CODE §§ 2052-53
(West 1958 & Supp. 1981), adopted a regulation to protect some species of butterfies. Price, supra
note 14, at 12. The OAL objected to this extension of the Commission's authority. Letter of July
29, 1980, to Fish and Game Commission, at 1. See generally Price, supra note 14, at 13. The
predominant theme underlying the OAL's disapprovals for overstepping authority appears to be
strict constructionism. Former OAL Director Gene Livingston admits to being a strict construc-
tionist. See Livingston Interview, .mpra note 72.
Many of the authority issues facing the OAL pose difficult and interesting questions of inter-
pretation. For example, what is the scope of the Coastal Commission's powers, both substan-
tively-what types of development projects are covered-and procedurally-what kinds of
procedures may be utilized by the Commission? Letter of May 28, 1982, to California Coastal
Commission, 82 Cal. Admin. Reg. No. 23-Z (June 5, 1982), at B-14 to B-15; eealso Letter of May
1, 1981, to Department of Health Services, at 1.
186. For example, the OAL disapproved a provision of the Board of Accountancy's Rules of
Professional Conduct that would have forbidden licensees from engaging in any discriminatory
practice or conduct. The OAL argued that the Board could establish standards of "integrity and
dignity" for accountants, but could not forbid all conduct that the Board deems inappropriate.
Letter of Apr. 30, 1981 to Board of Accountancy, at 2. The Board appealed the OAL's decision to
the Governor, and the Governor reached a conclusion contrary to the OAL's analysis. Memo of
June 5, 1981, to OAL from Governor's Office, 81 OAL 1, at 6 (on file with author). See generaly
ReguatorAgency Adcton: Board ofAccowutancy, CA!.. RIo.L. REP., Spring 1982, at 33.
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cies appeal few disapprovals to the Governor, 87 the OAL's legal opin-
ions about authority and consistency will in most cases be final,
whether right or wrong. Agencies have had no means of securing judi-
cial review of OAL disapprovals. However, since January 1, 1983, in-
terested persons have been able to obtain court review of OAL
disapprovals; whether the promulgating agency may seek review is
unclear.188
Courts traditionally have deferred to agency interpretations of
their own governing statutes, 89 although they have always been free to
substitute their judgment on questions of law for that of the agencies. 190
The rationale behind this judicial deference to agency legal opinions -
that the agency is more familiar than the reviewer with its governing
statutes - applies to OAL review of agency opinions as well.' 91 It is
therefore arguable that the OAL should not substitute its interpretation
of statutes for that of the agencies. Yet, the OAL's organic statute
clearly authorizes such substitution.
An assessment of the wisdom of the OAL's power in this regard
requires an analysis of whether it is appropriate to err on the side of
preventing some otherwise valid regulations. If it is, it must then be
determined whether it is appropriate to vest such power in the OAL.
Erring on the side of non-adoption certainly comports with the views of
those regulatory reformers concerned primarily with reducing the
number of regulations. The major harm from an excessive tendency
toward non-adoption is delay. If the legislature disagrees with an OAL
disapproval on this ground, it can redraft the relevant statute to clarify
This appeal may exemplify the Governor's use of the reversal power to effectuate political
policy choices. Former OAL Director Livingston believes most gubernatorial reversals of the
OAL are for reasons of philosophy or political expediency, and he considers the Governor's abil-
ity to reverse OAL decisions on policy grounds to be one of the strengths of A.B. I 111. In con-
trast, he sees the OAL's role as restricted to making objective decisions based on compliance with
the statutory standards, without regard to policy implications. Livingston Interview, supra note 72.
187. See supra note 68.
188. 1982 Cal. Stat. 1544, 1573; see infra text accompanying notes 258-59.
189. White v. Winchester Club, 315 U.S. 32, 41 (1942); Fawcus Mach. Co. v. United States,
282 U.S. 375,378 (1931); Ralph's Grocery Co. v. Reimel, 69 Cal. 2d 172, 175, 176,444 P.2d 79, 83,
70 Cal. Rptr. 407, 411 (1968); Morris v. Williams, 67 Cal. 2d 733, 748, 433 P.2d 697, 707, 63 Cal.
Rptr. 689, 699 (1967); Whitcomb Hotel v. Cal. Employment Comm'n, 24 Cal. 2d 753, 756-57, 151
P.2d 233, 235 (1944).
190. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Sanchez v. Unem-
ployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 20 Cal. 3d 55, 67, 569 P.2d 740, 748, 141 Cal. Rptr. 146, 154 (1977);
Carmona v. Division of Indus. Safety, 13 Cal. 3d 303, 310, 530 P.2d 161, 165-66, 118 Cal. Rptr.
473, 477-78 (1975); Whitcomb Hotel v. Cal. Employment Comm'n, 24 Cal. 2d 753, 757, 151 P.2d
233, 235 (1944).
191. Pitts v. Perluss, 58 Cal. 2d 824, 832, 377 P.2d 83, 88, 27 Cal. Rptr. 19, 24 (1962).
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the agency's rulemaking authority. 92 The agency could thereafter re-
adopt the regulation. The new statute authorizing the public to judi-
cially challenge OAL disapprovals further protects against OAL abuse
of its power.
It seems appropriate that the power to review the basic legality of
regulations reside in the OAL. The OAL is a quasi-independent execu-
tive branch agency;1 93 its judgments are subject to gubernatorial rever-
sal. 194 This creates some conflict because in California's executive
branch the Attorney General, who is elected by the people and not
appointed by the Governor,1 95 is the primary source of agency legal
advice and opinions. The OAL may, however, contradict legal advice
that the Attorney General gives agencies concerning their rulemaking
authority,1 96 and unless someone seeks judicial review the OAL's legal
opinion will prevail.
This conflict between the Attorney General and the OAL is on
balance acceptable. It makes sense to vest all regulatory review power
in one body. It would be duplicative, confusing, and burdensome to
vest legal review in the Attorney General, and all other review -
which inevitably also has legal aspects - in the OAL. The alterna-
tive, placing all regulatory review under the Attorney General, would
be a very poor policy choice in California. The Governor, as chief ex-
ecutive officer, is responsible for the executive branch agencies. If the
Attorney General were subordinate to the Governor rather than in-
dependent, a role for that officer in the legal aspects of the review pro-
cess would be appropriate. Under California's governmental structure,
however, giving the Attorney General a role in regulatory review
would inevitably politicize the review process. The Governor and At-
torney General can be from different political parties and may even be
political rivals. If the Attorney General made legal judgments in the
review process that were subject to gubernatorial reversal, some of
those judgments and reversals undoubtedly would reflect direct polit-
ical rivalry. Thus, California agencies will have to be tolerant of con-
flict between the Attorney General and the OAL.
192. This result of course assumes that the agency has sufficient legislative support and atten-
tion to succeed in having a bill passed. Frequently this will not be the case, and the OAL's judg-
ment would prevail.
193. § 11340.2 (West 1980). The OAL Director does not serve at the pleasure of the Gover-
nor, Price, jrVra note 14, at 23, but undoubtedly can be fired for cause. qC Humphrey's Executor
v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 623-24 (1935) (President could fire Federal Trade Commissioner
only for cause).
194. § 11349.5 (west 1980).
195. CAL. CONST. art. V, § 11.
196. A third opinion could be produced on appeal to the Governor. § 11349.5 (West 1980).
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2. Necessity: Substance Review. Of all the powers vested in the
OAL, the power to determine whether an agency's regulations meet the
test of "necessity" is at once the most far-reaching' 97 and the most con-
troversial.19 8 The necessity criterion is ambiguous. 99 Deliberate ambi-
guity may have been critical to legislative acceptability, but it causes
serious administrative difficulty.
a. Theory and Intent. Some regulations are necessary because
the legislature has mandated their adoption;20" such regulations easily
pass the necessity test. All other regulations are adopted at the option
of the agencies. Agencies can, and often do, accomplish their statutory
purposes with little or no use of their rulemaking power.20 1 Through
case-by-case adjudication agencies can develop standards which, after
sufficient usage, function almost as effectively as rules to influence later
cases.20 2 Regulations are, of course, an extremely useful tool that an
agency may use to make its operations more efficient, effective, and
fair.20 3 But even if all the regulations in the California Administrative
Code were to vanish overnight, California's administrative agencies
would continue to function and regulation would continue.20 4 Pub-
197. The necessity standard "carries the seeds of enormous power." Price, supra note 14, at 6.
"OAL may well be King of the Mountain. Think what President Carter's Regulatory Analysis
Review Group would have given for the power to review and veto regulations on the basis of
'necessity'!" See More GovernmentalInnovationftom the Golden State, REO., Jan.-Feb. 1981, at 9.
198. See Erbin and Fellmeth, supra note 25; see also Spohn, "Rues for the Regulators'Regula-
tor CAL. REG. L. REP., winter 1982, at 3.
199. The regulatory reform plans of the Reagan Administration and the United States Senate
require rules to pass a straightforward cost-benefit test. Reagan Order, supra note 26, § 2; S. 1080,
supra note 2, at S2715 (limited to major rules).
200. Pedersen,supra note 103, at 38; Starr, supra note 14, at 720. In the 1981 California Legis-
lative Session, more than 500 bills that were introduced mandated rulemaking. Id at 5.
201. The National Labor Relations Board, for example, has almost never issued substantive
rules. B. ScslwART-z, ADmnrmSrATivE LAW 188 n.220 (1976). Under some circumstances due
process may require adoption of regulations to precede enforcement actions. Fuchs, Development
and Diversffcation in Administrative .Rue Making, 72 Nw. U.L. REv. 83, 97-102 & n.50 (1977)
(discussing, ier a/ia, Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974)). Generally the choice between issuing
rules or proceeding by case-by-case adjudication is within the informed discretion of the ad-nii-
trative agency. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974) (Black, J., concurring);
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 201-02 (1947).
202. A standard developed in adjudication becomes a precedent for subsequent adjudications.
After sufficient development of the standard, official notice can be taken of it, and it will function
in rule-like fashion in subsequent enforcement proceedings. See, eg., In re Manco Watch Strap
Co., 60 F.T.C. 495 (1962); B. ScHWARTZ, supra note 201, at 364-74.
203. Cooper, spra note 4, at 197. Regulated firms quite commonly "prefer that an agency
proceed by rulemaking and regulation rather than by adjudication." Id; see also Spohn, supra
note 198, at 3; Wright, supra note 104, at 201-02.
204. Realistically, of course, the inefficiency of case-by-case adjudication would make it very
difficult for some agencies to "discharge their sweeping mandates." Pedersen, supra note 103, at
38.
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lished regulations are thus not "necessary" in an absolute sense. There-
fore, to interpret the language of the necessity standard literally seems
absurd.
Consequently, it may be accurate to conclude that by "necessity"
the legislature means reasonable necessity. Such an interpretation
seems sensible,2°5 and legislative developments appear to support it. In
195 1, a test of reasonable necessity was written into the California Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act.206 A.B. 1111 and its immediate progeny
did not alter this test.2°7 In fact A.B. 1111 appears to have added "rea-
sonably necessary" language to the APA's judicial review standard;208
however, A.B. 1111 omitted the long-used modifier "reasonable" from
the "necessity" test that the OAL enforces.2°9
The complaint in regulatory reform rhetoric that many regulations
are "unnecessary" may explain this apparently absolutist stance. Polit-
ical rhetoric deals in absolutes. It condemns regulations for being un-
necessary, not for being not reasonably necessary. It pays no heed to
the theoretical non-necessity of virtually all regulations. As the statu-
tory embodiment of a rhetorical flourish, the bare "necessity" standard
may express only a general antipathy to regulation and a desire for
improved factual support for each specific regulation.
During the 1982 legislative session, OAL-supported legislation was
introduced that would have deleted the qualification "reasonably"
from the phrase "reasonably necessary" in the two places it appears in
the APA.210 Such a legislative change would have evidenced legislative
favor for the absolutist view of necessity, and the change could have
been used to argue that virtually any regulation failed to meet the ne-
cessity standard. Shortly before passage, however, the bill was
amended to retain the reasonableness language. As so amended the
bill passed.211 This episode supports the conclusion that the legislature
205. Starr believes "necessity" and "reasonably necessary" to be abstract equivalents, but
claims the statutory context requires the OAL to show less deference to the agencies than have the
courts. See Starr, gpra note 14, at 718. He feels comfortable with this diminished deference for
two reasons. First, the OAL will have the rulemaking file. This reason does not hold up because
the courts also will have the file. Second, the OAL "may employ staff with requisite expertise to
review highly technical regulations." Id (footnote omitted). This reason also does not hold up;
the OAL has not chosen to employ such people. See Livingston Interview, supra note 72.
206. 1951 Cal. Stat. 479.
207. See § 11342.2 (West 1980).
208. 1979 Cal. Stat. 567, art. 7; see § 11350(b) (West 1980).
209. §§ 11349 and 11349.1 (West 1980).
210. A.B. 2820, §§ 11342.2, 11346.7, as amended June 28, 1982.
211. 1982 Cal. Stat. 1573; telephone interview with Gene Livingston, first Director of the OAL
(resigned effective October 31, 1982), Nov. 23, 1982 (notes on file with author) [hereinafter cited as
Livingston Interview].
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never really meant for necessity to be interpreted as an absolute, but
rather that the OAL and the courts are to test each regulation for rea-
sonable necessity.
The legislature probably did not intend A.B. 1111 to change any
substantive standard - regulations have had to be "reasonably neces-
sary" for many years - but merely to create an enforcement mecha-
nism in the executive branch.212
To date, the OAL's interpretation of the necessity standard sup-
ports this view. Although failure to meet the necessity standard is the
most frequent reason for OAL disapproval of regulations, 2 3 the OAL
has not applied an absolutist reading of "necessity." 21 4 In fact, a
number of its disapproval letters use the phrase "reasonably necessary"
interchangeably with "necessity" as the relevant standard.21 5
b. Necessityfor *hat? The elimination of absolute necessity as a
possible meaning for the necessity standard does not end the inquiry
into the content of the standard. When regulations were subject only to
judicial review, the courts never determined the content of the "reason-
ably necessary" standard that has long been part of California's
APA. 216 In the midst of this void the OAL reviews each regulation for
necessity, and finds many lacking.
The definition of necessity that the OAL proposes is tautologi-
cal. 217 It fails to answer the question: "Necessity for what?" The stat-
212. The necessity provision parallels the emergency standard in that respect. See supra text
accompanying notes 83-84.
213. The OAL cited lack of necessity in 127 (51%) of the 248 disapprovals during 1981-82.
Procedural deficiencies of all types were a basis for 122 disapprovals; clarity was a basis in 71;
authority was a basis in 43; and consistency was a basis in 39. Many disapprovals are for multiple
reasons. 1981-82 OAL ANNuAL RP. 7-8.
214. This observation is of particular interest because the OAL's former director believes the
agency is intended to be a strict constructionist See Livingston Interview, supra note 72. The
OAL has strictly construed other elements of its statutory mandate, see supra text accompanying
notes 111-15, and it strictly construes agency authority as well, see supra text accompanying notes
185-91.
215. See Letter of Dec. 31, 1980, to State Athletic Commission, at 2; Letter of Jan. 7, 1981, to
California Horse Racing Board, at 1; Letter of May 18, 1981, to Department of Real Estate, at 2.
The Governor's Office has consistently referred to a reasonable necessity standard in its ap-
peal determinations. See, eg., Letter of Dec. 14, 1981, to New Motor Vehicle Board, 81 Cal.
Admin. Reg. No. 52-Z (Dec. 26, 1981), at 35; Letter of Nov. 30, 1981, to Gene Livingston (re:
Department of Corrections), 81 Cal. Admin. Reg. No. 52-Z (Dec. 26, 1981), at 63-64.
216. See, ag., ALRB v. Superior CL, 16 Cal. 3d 392,411,546 P.2d 687, 699-700, 128 Cal. Rptr.
183, 195-96 (1976); Morris v. Williams, 67 Cal. 2d 733, 749, 433 P.2d 697, 707, 63 Cal. Rptr. 689,
699 (1967); Pitts v. Perluss, 58 Cal. 2d 824, 834-35, 377 P.2d 83, 89-90, 27 Cal. Rptr. 19, 25-26
(1962).
217. See .supra text accompanying note 61.
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utes also provide no answer, despite the 1982 amendment that
essentially adopted the OAL's necessity definition.
A comparison with the standard of necessity required to support
emergency rulemaking procedures illustrates this ambiguity. To qual-
ify for emergency adoption, a regulation must be "necessary for the
immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, or gen-
eral welfare." 218 This standard has specific content against which a re-
viewer can judge the agency's use of emergency procedures. 19 To
assure that the OAL properly exercises its discretion within the frame-
work of legislative intent, the legislature should state in what sense a
regulation must be considered necessary. For example, the legislature
might consider legislation providing that "'necessity' means that the
agency has demonstrated in the rulemaking file that the proposed regu-
lation is needed for the fair, efficient, fiscally sound or effective imple-
mentation of its organic statute." Language of this type would direct
the agencies to the types of factual support they need to demonstrate
the necessity of proposed regulations. It would also focus the OAL's
attention on the acceptable varieties of support for a regulation.
Even if the legislature does not provide such a definition, the OAL
should consider a procedural regulation detailing what an agency must
establish to meet the necessity standard. The staff of the OAL has been
making necessity decisions for several years. The agency therefore
must have some shared notion of necessity that could be memorialized.
If it has not had such a sense, the need is manifest for the OAL to curb
its discretion by clarifying its position on the definition of necessity.2 0
c. Scope of Review - How Well Proven a Necessity? Even
though neither the legislature nor the OAL has adequately defined ne-
cessity, both have exhibited concern about what standard of review the
OAL should employ in reviewing regulations for necessity. The only
relevant statutory language prior to 1982 prohibited both the OAL and
the courts from substituting their judgment on the content of regula-
tions for that of the adopting agency.22'
The California courts have traditionally applied the deferential
"arbitrary and capricious" test when reviewing the substantive content
218. § 11346.1 (b) (West 1980).
219. See supra notes 150-55 and accompanying text.
220. The OAL was in existence for almost two years before it proposed regulations governing
its own procedures. Livingston Interview, jupra note 72. The OAL's critics were particularly
incensed that OAL had not earlier regularized its own procedures by adopting regulations.
Spohn, jmpra note 198, at 2. The legislature has now mandated that the OAL adopt such regula-
tions. 1982 Cal. Stat. 1544, § 1; 1573, § 5.
221. § 11340.1 (West 1980).
Vol. 1983".231]
HeinOnline -- 1983 Duke L.J.  269 1983
270 DUKE LAW JO URJAL [Vol. 1983:231
of adopted regulations.222 Following the lead of the OAL, which has
proposed regulations to the same effect, 223 the legislature has replaced
the arbitrary and capricious standard with the "substantial evidence"
test.224 The substantial evidence test, which has traditionally been ap-
plied in reviewing agency adjudicatory decisions,225 is usually less def-
erential than the arbitrary and capricious test.22 6 Courts and scholars
have expressed doubt, however, that there is much difference between
the two standards, particularly when there is a record available for re-
view.227 Accordingly, A.B. 111 's requirement of a "closed" rulemak-
ing record may alone substantially eliminate the distinction between
the two standards.228
222. See Estate of Fasken, 19 Cal. 3d 412, 439-40, 563 P.2d 832, 848-49, 138 Cal. Rptr. 276,
292-93 (1976", (Mosk, J., dissenting); Ralph's Grocery Co. v. Reimel, 69 Cal. 2d 172, 179, 444 P.2d
79, 85,70 Cal. Rptr. 407, 413 (1968); Pitts v. Perluss, 58 Cal. 2d 824, 832, 377 P.2d 83, 88, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 19, 24 (1962).
223. PRoposED REoULATIONS, supra note 61, § 160.
224. 1982 Cal. Stat. 1573, § 4, amending § 11349(a).
Another 1982 bill proposed a more complex review formulation that would have satisfied
necessity by "fair and substantial reasons" found in facts, testimony, assessments, or "other infor-
mation of a persuasive nature" in the rulemaking file. A.B. 3322, § 11349(a), as introduced Mar.
11, 1982. The bill was amended before passage to eliminate this definition. 1982 Cal. Stat. 1544.
A number of recent federal enactments include a substantial evidence test. See Scalia, supra
note 105, at 39.
225. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,414 (1971); Alviani, supra
note 2, at 301.
226. Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607,705 (1980) (Marshall,
J. dissenting); Consumers Union v. CPSC, 491 F.2d 810, 812 (2d Cir. 1974); Mobil Oil Corp. v.
FPC, 483 F.2d 1238, 1258-60 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
It is generally assumed that the arbitrary and capricious test is the federal standard for review
of informal rulemaking. See Pedersen, supra note 103, at 47-48 & n. 48; Verkuil, Jutdcial Review
ofInfornal Ruemakg, 60 VA. L. REv. 185, 212 (1974); c. Note, Judcial Review of the Facts in
Informal Rulemaking: A Proposed Standard, 84 YALE L.J. 1750, 1756-60 (1975) (discrepancy be-
tween Supreme Court and lower courts in choice of review standard). But see Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe 401 U.S. 402, 414 (1971) (dictum).
227. National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d 688, 705 (2d Cir. 1975) (Lum-
bard, J., concurring); Associated Indus. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 487 F.2d 342, 349-50 (2d
Cir. 1973); Bunny Bear, Inc. v. Peterson, 473 F.2d 1002, 1005-06 (1st Cir. 1973); Pedersen, supra
note 103, at 48-49 & n.49; Scalia, supra note 105, at 39; Note, supra note 226, at 1753.
228. The United States Senate's desire to impose a more stringent review standard than "arbi-
trary and capricious" review was translated into the standard of "substantial support" in pending
regulatory reform legislation. S. 1080,su pra note 2, at S2718. The choice of this new term instead
of the term "substantial evidence" was to avoid any implication that trial-type procedures were
necessary in informal rulemaking. S. REP. No. 284, supra note 138, at 166. In ehsence, the new
term offers a fresh start in case development.
Both the Governor's draft and early introduced drafts ofA.B. 1111 required that the evidence
supporting the necessity of a regulation be substantial in light of the whole record. Governor's
Draft (undated) at 16, § 11350; A.B. 1111, as amended in Assembly April 26, 1979, § 11349;
Spohn, supra note 198, at 3. After the expression of concern about the use of this term of art
associated with adjudication, the language was removed. See § 11350 (West 1980).
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Nevertheless, two problems might accompany the change to sub-
stantial evidence review. Because of the heavy baggage that the sub-
stantial evidence terminology carries as a result of having been
developed almost exclusively in the context of adjudication, formalities
familiar from adjudication could be imported into the rulemaking pro-
cess.2 Also, the shift in standard, combined with the formalization of
the rulemaking record, could diminish agency use of informed judg-
ment below the minimum level acceptable for sound policymaking. In
the final analysis, however, the impact of the new standard on the
OAL's review for reasonable necessity depends a great deal on the
OAL's conception of what is reasonable.
d. Disapprovals Under the Necessity Standard During its first
two years the.OAL's disapprovals on the basis of the necessity standard
have fallen into three major groups. The first and largest group com-
prises regulations for which the agency provided an insufficient factual
basis.0
The second group includes submissions that the OAL found to be
duplicative of existing statutory language or other regulations; a dupli-
cative legal requirement, the OAL concluded, cannot be necessary.231
That conclusion seems sound. The Legislature has concurred by
adopting nonduplication as a sixth standard for OAL review.232
A third category comprises of material that the OAL found was
not regulatory in nature.233 The OAL has taken the position that sub-
missions not in conformance with the APA definition of a "regula-
tion ' 234 need not be adopted in accordance with its procedures and,
therefore, should not become part of the California Administrative
Code. No real harm would be done if the OAL were to allow non-
regulatory material to be adopted in regulatory fashion and included in
the Administrative Code. This practice would, however, conflict with
the goal of reducing the number of regulations, and would detract from
the attractiveness of the statistics describing the effectiveness of regula-
229. See sWpa text accompanying notes 124-38.
230. See *fr'a text accompanying notes 235-42. In the approximately 230 sets of regulations
reviewed by the author for this article, this variant of failure to meet the necessity standard was
encountered 136 times.
231. This variant of failure to meet the necessity standard was encountered 43 times in the
approximately 230 sets of regulations reviewed by the author.
232. 1982 Cal. Stat. 1544, 1573; see xpra note 58.
233. An example is an agency's publication of the location of its office. Letter of May 20,
1981, to State Building Standards Commission, at 1. This variant of failure to meet the necessity
standard was encountered 26 times in the approximately 230 sets of regulations reviewed by the
author.
234. § 11342(b) (West 1980).
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tory reform. In any event, because agencies are free to include in their
own publications useful nonregulatory information, the OAL's position
is of little consequence.
The first category of necessity disapprovals best illustrates the seri-
ous implications of "necessity" review. Disapprovals of a number of
proposals involving fee increases and training standards demonstrate
the OAL's approach to necessity review.
Many agencies are authorized to set fees for services and licenses
that they provide. The OAL has disapproved a number of fee increases
on the ground that the increase was not necessary.23" It found that the
agencies' fiscal analyses were insufficient to justify the fees sought.236
For a fee increase, the agency typically has all the information
needed for rational decisionmaking: the costs the fees are needed to
cover, the revenue expected from the increase, the amount revenue will
exceed costs, and the justification for the surplus. The disapproved reg-
ulations show a tendency by the agencies arbitrarily to round up their
fees, even without demonstrable evidence of need for the additional
funds.237 The OAL's disapprovals are thus appropriate. Even without
further definition of necessity, it is reasonable to require substantiation
of fiscal need to demonstrate that a fee increase is reasonably necessary.
Although there are policy aspects to fee determinations - such as the
size of necessary surpluses - the increases generally depend on fiscal
analysis rather than individual perspective, philosophy, or judgment.
Thus, these decisions are primarily fact-determined. Fact-determined
decisions lend themselves well to centralized review by a general re-
viewing agency like the OAL. The OAL can readily identify the ques-
tions to be asked to assess the propriety of the agency's decision, and
these questions should be answerable by reference to determinable
facts. The judgments underlying the decision are minimal, and those
judgments that are necessary can appropriately be made by nonexpert
reviewers.
The OAL's decisions about appropriate agency fees are in stark
contrast with its decisions concerning appropriate training and licens-
235. Letter of Nov. 28, 1980, to Water Resources Control Board; Letter of Sept. 24, 1981, to
Department of Housing and Community Development, 81 Cal. Admin. Reg. No. 39-Z (Sept. 26,
1981), at 28; Letter of Sept. 25, 1981, to State Lands Commission, 81 Cal. Admin. Reg. No. 39-Z
(Sept. 26, 1981), at 30, 32; Letter of Nov. 13, 1981, to New Motor Vehicle Board, 81 Cal. Admin.
Reg. No. 46-Z (Nov. 14, 1981) at 12, 13.
236. Letter of Dec. 30, 1981, to Physical Therapy Examining Committee; Letter of Apr. 8,
1982, to Division of Occupational Safety and Health.
237. Letter of Nov. 13, 1981, to New Motor Vehicle Board, supra note 235.
[Vol. 1983:231
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ing standards.238 The propriety of a particular fee level can be judged
in relationship to facts that can be demonstrated or predicted with
some accuracy. The propriety of a training standard, however, can be
judged, if at all, only in relation to intangibles. Whether a standard is
effective in attaining a set goal is an elusive question. The answer re-
'quires a multifactoral analysis of data that often will be impossible to
obtain as a practical matter, any collectible data would likely fail to
yield definitive conclusions. Perspective, philosophy, and judgment -
particularly expert judgment - will ultimately play a significant role in
formulating such standards.239
This type of decision could be called judgment-determined: al-
though informed by facts, the decision calls for an exercise of judg-
ment.240 With this type of decision, there may be considerable
disagreement about the questiorts.that should be asked to check the
validity of the agency's views. Moreover, there may be no hard facts to
answer the questions, only hazy predictions and imprecise estimates.
Reliance on views expressed in the rulemaking file would also be haz-
ardous, as the judgment of the regulated community may reflect a
238. Letter of Apr. 20,1981, to Board of Vocational Nurse and Psychiatric Technician Exam-
iners, Letter of May 13, 1981, to Board of Dental Examiners; Letter of Sept. 3, 1981, to State
Board of Examiners of Nursing Home Administrators, 81 Cal. Admin. Reg. No. 36-Z (Sept. 5,
1981), at 49; Letter of Nov. 2, 1981, to State Board of Examiners of Nursing Home Adminstrators,
81 Cal. Admin- Reg. No. 45-Z (Nov. 11, 1981), at 23.
239. One example arises from a series of three disapproval letters issued to the Board of Ex-
aminers of Nursing Home Administrators. See Letter of Sept. 3,1981, to State Board of Examin-
ers of Nursing Home Administrators, supra note 238, at 49; Letter of Nov. 2, 1981, to State Board
of Examiners of Nursing Home Administrators, supra note 238; Letter of Jan. 28, 1982, to State
Board of Examiners of Nursing Home Administrators, 82 Cal. Admin. Reg. No. 5-Z (Jan. 30,
1982), at 79. The Board, reviewing existing regulations, promulgated regulations that administra-
tor-trainees were to receive four hours of instruction per day from their preceptors and spend 75
percent of their training time in the preceptor's facility. Despite repeated requests from the OAL,
the Board was unable to provide "specific facts" to support the necessity of the regulations which
the OAL disapproved.
It is unclear whether it was at all possible for the Board to prove to the OAL's satisfaction
that the regulations were necessary. The Board perhaps could have added facts to the rulemaking
file or offered witnesses to testify that 75 percent was the "necessary" figure. Certainly the ap-
propriate figures for the regulations could not be demonstrated by the type of precise facts avail-
able in the fee cases.
It is demonstrable that licensing arose as a substitute for the restrictive guild system and still
frequently operates to create restrictive barriers to professional entry that are unnecessary for
public protection. G. RoBINsON, E. Go .THON., H. BRuFp, THE ADMINSTRATIvE PROCESS 611-
19 (2d ed. 1980). It is therefore arguable that the OAL serves the purposes of regulatory reform
when it intensely scrutinizes regulations such as those discussed above. This argument is mis-
guided, however. The problem of restrictive licensing must be addressed by legislatures that have
mandated licensure and often placed its control in the hands of licensee decisionmakers. Id at
616; cf. 1976 Cal. Stat. 1188 (adding non-licensee members to licensing boards).
240 .q Scaa upra note 105, at 41 ("Sometimes the evidence is not the only applicable
Lxerion.") (emphasis in original).
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greater interest in preserving the status quo than in protecting the pub-
lic welfare.
The OAL argues that it is simply demanding factual proof of ne-
cessity when it disapproves such judgment-determined decisions.24'
This argument drastically understates the OAL's role. When the facts
are elusive, unavailable, or controversial, the OAL is by definition sub-
stituting its judgment for that of the agency when it disapproves such a
regulation.242
This is not entirely a fault of the OAL staff, or even of its philoso-
phy. It is a flaw inherent in the system. A centralized review process
will inevitably produce such substitutions of judgment because many
categories of regulation ultimately depend on someone exercising judg-
ment. The agency with power to make its judgments prevail necessar-
ily has decisive authority.
This problem of substitution of judgment is another manifestation
of the question of how much reliance on expertise is appropriate in the
rulemaking process.243 The OAL has occasionally stated in its disap-
proval letters that an agency could use experience as a justification for
a regulation,244 but other disapprovals suggest little OAL deference to
agency expertise.245
241. Livingston Interview, supra note 72.
242. See More Governmentallnnovationfrom the Golden State, supra note 197, at 9 ("How one
can disagree with the necessity for a proposed rule without performing such substitution is a mys-
tery."); Erbin and Fellmeth, supra note 25, at 5; see also Spohn spra note 198, at 3; vfi Pedersen,
supra note 103, at 49 (to the extent uncertainties surround consequences of some agency actions,
courts have "moderate[d] any requirement that regulations be supported by 'proof' in some hard
and factual sense").
OAL's use of the necessity standard is not uniformly inappropriate. To the contrary, most
often its objections appear reasonably well-founded. For example, rejected regulations of the
Department of Education detailed rules for child care, such as minimum teacher and adult/child
ratios and staff training requirements, but were supported neither with information explaining
their specific purpose nor with their factual basis. Letter of May 21, 1982, to Department of
Education, 82 Cal. Admin. Reg. No. 22-Z (May 29, 1982), at B-2, B-3.
Similarly, the Department of Motor Vehicles wanted to require driving schools to post signs
of specific dimensions, urging the need for standardization, but failed to provide any indication
why standardized signs are needed at all. Letter of June 3, 1982, to Department of Motor Vehi-
cles, 82 Cal. Admin. Reg. No. 24-Z (June 12, 1982), at B-5, B-7. In these situations, the OAL has
properly found a lack of necessity where an agency's rationale is either unstated or conclusory. In
a sense the objection is procedural, directed initially to the lack of supporting documentation
rather than to the substance of the agency's judgmenL
243. See supra text accompanying notes 133-38. The OAL has a budget to hire consultants
but does not do so. Price, supra note 14, at 27 n.25. Its staff members are generalists; many are
lawyers. It would not solve any problems in regulation--and greatly increase its cost-were OAL
to duplicate the expertise of agencies. However, it might assist its reviewing function, as well as
greatly improve its relationships with agencies, if the OAL could call on a greater range of exper-
tise in performing its functions.
244. Letter of May 18, 1981, to Department of Real Estate, at 2; Letter of Apr. 2, 1981, to
California Highway Patrol, at 2.
245. See supra text accompanying notes 239-42.
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The OAL violates the APA when it substitutes its judgment for
that of the agency.246 The elimination of the prohibition on the OAL
substituting its judgment for that of the agencies would be the easiest
solution for this problem.247 The result would be frank centralized
control over rulemaking, with ultimate policy judgments situated in the
OAL, subject only to gubernatorial veto.248
The agencies would of course be outraged by such a change. Such
a change is not advisable, even though it might have little real impact
other than to legitimize the process that now exists. It would place tre-
mendous judgmental power in the hands of an agency that is less ac-
countable and less expert than the adopting agencies themselves.
Moreover, ranting such sweeping discretion to the OAL would place it
under intense political pressures and make neutrality impossible. The
present OAL can deflect political pressure by using the excuse that its
review is limited by the prohibition against substitution of judgment. If
that restriction were eliminated, the OAL would no longer have this
shield. Elimination of this limit on the OAL's power is thus both un-
wise and unresponsive to the regulatory reformers' desire for increased
accountability and improved decisionmaking.
Alternatively, moving the regulatory review function into the Gov-
ernor's Office, in tandem with eliminating the prohibition on substitu-
tion of judgment,2 49 would preserve and perhaps enhance
accountability. As chief executive the Governor is, after all, titularly
responsible for the agencies' acts. Admittedly, this solution to the sub-
stitution of judgment problem also would place ultimate judgment in
nonexpert hands, but the hands would be those of an accountable offi-
cial. Of more concern are the political ramifications of such a proposal.
The political pressures on the Governor would be more severe than
those that the OAL would face because the Governor is a partisan
political leader as well as an administrator. The Governor, who must
246. Cf § 11340.1 (West 1980).
247. The Legislature could provide that the prohibition would continue to apply to judicial
review.
248. Of course the courts could reverse the administrative decision as well. The courts review
only a small percentage of adopted rules, however. Court review has always been limited, but
under new legislation there will be broader substantial evidence review. See supra text accompa-
nying notes 223-26.
249. The American Bar Association advocated giving the President the power to modify or to
reverse agency decisions concerning regulations. Resolution A, American Bar Ass'n, Swnmary 01
Action ofthe House ofDelegates 11-12 (Aug. 1979); see 65 A.B.A. J. 1284 (1979). Resolution A is
criticized in Note, supra note 4,passm. The Note urges as an alternative a Board of Regulatory
Ampeals. See id at 578-84.
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worry about campaign contributions, would have more difficulty insu-
lating the process from interest group and lobbyist pressures than
would a director of the OAL. In the existing scheme the Governor
exerts final authority only if an agency appeals, and appeals are limited
in number.250
The injection of partisan politics into the review process would
also have unfortunate repercussions on administration.251 So far the
agencies have accepted most of the OAL's decisions, with varying de-
grees of grace.252 If partisan politics infected even the most mundane
review decisions, the agencies would be less likely to accept the results.
The legislature should be the location of politically charged decision-
making; one of the functions of administrative agencies is to provide a
decisionmaking mechanism less subject to political bias than the
legislature.
A far more promising solution would involve recognition of the
distinction between agency policy choices and the factual foundations
for those choices.253 The solution would involve completely rewriting
the necessity standard while retaining the prohibition on the substitu-
tion of judgment.
If the need for a regulation is factually demonstrable, taking into
account the state of the art in any given technological field, it is appro-
priate to require substantial support for its factual basis in the rulemak-
250. Only 24 appeals were taken to the Governor in the first two years of OAL's existence; 407
sets ofregulations were rejected during those two years. See 1981-82 OAL ANNUAL REPORT 6.
Of the 24 appeals, I I resulted in reversals of OAL's position, OAL was upheld nine times, and
four appeals were withdrawn. (Data compiled by author.) Although appeal to the Governor is
bureaucratically inexpensive, requiring only a letter, it may be politically costly; agencies are un-
doubtedly reluctant to involve the Governor unless the issue is significant to the agency. Living-
ston Interview, supra note 72. Cf Alviani, supra note 2, at 299-300 (federal agencies avoid direct
confrontation with OMB). Appeals thus are likely to remain limited, even when agencies recog-
nize the frequency of OAL reversal.
251. Cf Rosenberg, .mpra note 2, at 227-28 (opposition in 1941 to Office of Federal Adminis-
trative Procedure for fear of politicization of agency decisionmaking process).
252. About 20 percent of disapproved regulations are resubmitted. Livingston Interview, supra
note 72. Only 24 disapprovals were appealed as of June 1982. See supra note 68 (data compiled
by author); see also Price, supra note 14, at 8.
253. S. REP. No. 284, supra note 138, at 166. Note, supra note 226, supports such a recogni-
tion, and urges a "sliding scale" test for judicial review. Id at 1766. Arguing that "[c]omplex,
technical decisionmaking requires an adaptable approach," id at 1761, it concludes that "[tlhe
degree of factual support necessary [to uphold a regulation] should be recognized as varying di-
rectly with the determinability of the relevant data, and inversely with the societal risk addressed
by the regulation," I at 1765. DeLong considers it "wise to resist" dividing rulemaking into fact
and policy components, see supra note 36, at 294, while recognizing the need for judgment as well
as information to underlie the rulemaking process. "Application of intuition and value judgment
will always be necessary, but an agency can structure decisions and obtain information so as to
narrow the areas of normative choice and communicate the grounds of decision." Id at 355.
[Vol. 1983:231
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ing file. Without such support, the OAL should disapprove the rule.
To the extent that a regulation is based on a policy choice, the OAL
should require the agency to explain its choice in the rulemaking file,
and ensure that the choice is not arbitrary. An arbitrary policy choice
is one that is not reasonably supported by fact, testimony, or logic. The
OAL should have the power to disapprove agency policy judgments
only when they are arbitrary. This view of necessity would give sub-
stance to the existing APA prohibition on substitution of judgment,
while fully retaining the OAL's right to insist on both factual founda-
tions for fact-determined decisions2 4 and explanations of judgment for
judgment-determined decisions.25 5 Expertise as a foundation for judg-
ment would be recognized in the limited areas in which it is appropri-
ate.25 6 This solution is in harmony with the various legislative goals
behind the creation of the OAL: the OAL would still be effective in
reducing regulation and improving its quality, but would not be substi-
tuting its judgment for that of the adopting agencies.
There is no perfect solution to the problem of substitution of judg-
ment. A body that has broad powers to review but is prohibited from
reaching judgment inevitably will overstep the prohibition. The only
escape valve originally was the agency's right to appeal to the Gover-
nor.25 7 Amendments effective in 1983, however, allow interested per-
sons objecting to OAL disapprovals to obtain court declarations of the
validity of regulations. 258 The amendment is silent on whether the
adopting agency is itself an interested person,259 and consequently on
the relationship between gubernatorial and judicial review if the
agency is an interested person. The advent of judicial review of disap-
provals along with gubernatorial appeals might force the OAL to re-
spect the substitution of judgment prohibition. Additionally, should
the courts begin to define the ambiguous necessity standard, such a def-
inition would provide boundaries for the OAL's review function.
254. See supra text accompanying notes 235-38.
255. See supra text accompanying notes 238-40.
156. See spra text accompanying notes 137-44.
257. § 11349.5 (West 1980).
258. 1982 Cal. Stat. 1544, § 2; 1573, § 11.
259. Under the APA, an "interested person" for purposes of seeking declaratory relief in re-
gard to the validity of a regulation is someone who is subject to or affected by the regulation.
American Friends Sery. Comm. v. Procutier, 33 Cal. App. 3d 252, 255, 109 Cal. Rptr. 22, 23-24
(1973); Chas L. Harney, Inc. v. Contractors' State License Bd., 39 Cal. 2d 561, 564, 247 P.2d 913,
917 (1952). Of course, an agency itself is not subject to the regulation but may be considered
"affected" by the existence or nonexistence of the regulation. Another formulation defines an
interested person as someone with a direct rather than a consequential interest in the litigation.
Associated Boat Indus. v. Marshall, 104 Cal. App. 2d 21, 22, 230 P.2d 379, 380 (1951). On that
basis an agency might qualify.
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V. BUREAUCRACY AND CITIZEN ACCESS: PROBLEMS REQUIRING
SPECIAL STUDY
A. Bureaucracy.
From a purely bureaucratic cost perspective, the OAL review pro-
cess is reasonably sound. Strict time deadlines circumscribe the OAL's
review of new agency regulations,260 so the review process does not un-
necessarily delay their promulgation.
The review of existing regulations, however, involves considerably
greater delay. The OAL has six months to review regulations amended
in the course of the mandated review of existing regulations. 261 When-
ever an agency incorporates new regulatory ideas into its scheduled re-
view, the entire package falls into the six month review category. In
1982, the OAL's backlog was so severe that it accomplished its reviews
only shortly before statutory deadlines.262 Thus, many regulations
were delayed six months as a result of OAL review. Such lengthy de-
lays may cause enforcement problems, if only because of confusion. In
some instances the delay could cause serious programmatic con-
cerns.2 63 Once the initial review of current regulations is completed,
however, the far shorter deadlines for new regulations will be exclusive.
The cost of running the OAL is reasonably modest. 264 The OAL's
budget does not, however, represent the full cost of the review program.
Each agency must expend resources to generate the additional
paperwork required by the more complex rulemaking process.265 To
260. § 11349.3 (West 1980) (30 calendar days for approval or disapproval); § 11349.6 (West
1980) (10 calendar days for approval or disapproval of emergency regulations).
The legislature in 1982 added to § 11349.4 the requirement that the OAL expedite regulations
resubmitted without significant substantive change after previous disapproval. 1982 Cal. Stat.
1573, § 7.
The change in notice requirement from 30 to 45 days, also mandated by A.B. I I 11, see supra
note 27, combined with OAL review, inevitably results in some delay.
261. § 11349.7 (West 1980).
262. Livingston Interview, supra note 211.
263. Letter of Oct. 29, 1982, to the OAL from Claudia Foutz Executive Secretary, California
State Board of Pharmacy. Foutz sought expedited review of amendments concerning a passing
grade on the pharmacist licensure examination. "The issue involved here is whether to allow
pharmacists who flunk a section of the exam but receive an overall passing score, to become
licensed to practice... [because of the review delay] another 50 to 100 persons will be permitted
to be licensed ... and not competent in all facits [sic] of the practicing profession." Id The
Board filed changes in this section with the OAL on August 9, 1982; its next licensure examination
was scheduled for January 1983. In response to this expression of concern, the OAL approved the
amendments and they were filed on November 16, 1982.
264. OAL's 1982-83 fiscal year budget is $1.8 million, supporting 46 full time positions. Agen-
cies must reimburse the OAL for the services the OAL renders in reviewing regulations.
265. The OAL's critics charge that the OAL "has become the most onerous layer of red tape in
the government," OAL, A Red Tape Hdra, supra note 160, at 5; see Erbin and Fellmeth, .upra
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the extent that the hours spent improve the decisionmaking process,
however, it is not fair to charge those costs against the OAL. Whether
these costs will be recaptured by downstream bureaucratic savings is
presently unanswerable.
B. Citizen Access.
Whether the new requirements have improved citizen access to the
rulemaking process is a troublesome issue. Notwithstanding proce-
dural reforms designed to improve access, the increased emphasis on
the rulemaking record and the increased formality of the rulemaking
process could decrease the already limited influence of average citizens.
Those who can afford to construct a rulemaking file to support their
views will have an increased advantage over those who cannot afford
access to experts, studies, and ec6nomic analysis.2 "6
The existence of a centralized review agency theoretically creates
an additional conduit for input into the rulemaking process.267 The
OAL has taken the position, however, that interest groups may direct
their pressure only at the adopting agency.268 It supports this practice
by noting the statutory requirement that the OAL base its review solely
on the rulemaking file, which is made only by the adopting agency.
This position is supported by both the statute and policy considera-
tions. The OAL's function is to test agency decisions against a set of
note 25, at 5; some of their complaints are legitimate. Any review process, however, will impose
some paperwork burdens.
266. See mpra note 132. A congressional study of federal regulation found "that many agency
actions reflect more than anything else a responsiveness to the interests of the regulated industry
and a disregard of the underrepresented interests of the general public. ... because of the supe-
rior resources available to most regulated interests, the process of decision-making often is unfair;
the balance usually is tilted in advance against the public." Excervitfrom the Moss Committee
Rqort, supra note 89, at 419-20; Sr McLachlan, Democratizing the Administrative Process: To-
mrdlncraedReponsie ,s, 13 Amiz. L. Ray. 835, 836 (1971) (public interest best served when
competing interest groups present their demands).
This potential imbalance might be countered by financial-assistance to underrepresented in-
terests to enable their effective participation. Note, FederalAgency Assiance to Impecunious In-
tervenors, 88 HARv. L Ry. 1815, 1826-30 (1975); see ButzeL Intervetion and ClassActions Before
the Agencies and the Courts, 25 AD. L. REy. 135, 144 (1973); Cramton, The Why, W 'ere andHow
of Broadened.Public Particiation in the Admnistrative Process, 60 GEo. LJ. 525, 543-45 (1972);
Citizens fora Safe Environment v. AEC, 489 F.2d 1018, 1022 & n.3 (3d Cir. 1974); c. Greene
County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412, 425-27 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 409 U.S. 849
(1972Xagencies only have power to award fees if Congress explicitly so provides in the enabling
act).
267. Livingston Interview, supra note 72. The parallel concern is raised about industry access
to the OMB, the reviewer of federal agency regulations, see Alviani, supra note 2, at 308; Rosen-
berg, supra note 2, at 243-46; and about state legislative or executive reviewers of rules, see M.
HImNDtz, sWa note 3, at 12, 19.
2,. Section 132, PtoposED REouA.AroNs, upra note 61.
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procedural and substantive criteria in a fashion seemingly designed to
encourage neutrality. It is advisable, therefore, that it avoid contacts
intended to influence its evaluation of agency judgment.2 69
Despite its official stance on exparte contacts, however, the OAL
has sought information outside the rulemaking file from at least one
group other than the promulgating agencies.270 The OAL believes that
it is appropriate to seek the views of legislators and their staffs concern-
ing legislative intent.271 It has done so a number of times to determine
whether the authors of statutes contemplated emergency adoptions of
implementing regulations.272 Although this approach may save the
OAL from legislative wrath, and does not conflict with the OAL's own
proposed rules, it is inappropriate for two reasons. First, the APA lim-
its the OAL solely to review of the rulemaking file to protect the OAL
against extraneous influences.273 Its provisions make no exceptions
either for review of emergency regulations or for contacts with
legislators.
Second, accepted procedures for determining legislative intent do
269. Some critics of the OAL claim that the OAL has not rigidly enforced its putative position
on exparte contacts. Seeming to cite Livingston, Erbin and Fellmeth claim that "OAL will permit
exparte communications to the extent those communications refer to the rulemaking file." Erbin
and Fellmeth, supra.note 25, at 5. The California Regulatory Law Reporter, staffed by Erbin and
Fellmeth, continues to insinuate that the OAL has "expare secret contacts [with] those with a
profit stake in [the] rules," OA1 A Red Tape Hydra?, .apra note 160, at 5; Is This Realy Neces-
sxaty?, supra note 102, at 14.
The OAL's rule does not apply to the review of emergency regulations or existing regulations,
where no file exists. § 132, PRoPosED REGULATIONS, supra note 61. In those reviews, the OAL
seeks public input. Livingston Interview, upra note 72.
270. Letter of Apr. 29,1982, to Department of Health Services, 82 Cal. Admin. Reg. No. 18-Z
(May 1, 1982), at 30, Letter of Apr. 16, 1982, supra note 152, at 41-42 (discussions with Calfornia
Cattlemen's Association and legislative staff); Letter of Oct. 23, 1980, to Governor Brown (re:
Certified Shorthand Reporters Board), at 1; Letter of Sept. 12, 1980, to Board of Medical Quality
Assurance.
271. Livingston Interview, upra note 72. Livingston did not mention contacts with private
"sponsors" of legislation. There can be no justification for such contacts, as reflected in Letter of
Apr. 16, 1982, to Department of Food and Agriculture, pra note 152.
272. The legislature recently created a mechanism for assuring OAL attention to regulations
of particular interest to members. At legislative request, the OAL must initiate a priority review of
designated regulations, without regard to their place on the agency's review plan. 1982 Cal. Stat.
1573, § 9; 1236, § 4 (adding §§ 11349.7(mXn)).
273. § 11349.1 (West 1980).
Under the Reagan Order the OMB views the agencies as the "primary forum for receiving
factual communications regarding proposed rules," but will on occasion itself receive factual ma-
terial that it believes relevant to the rulemaking. The OMB claims that Sierra Club v. Costle, 657
F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981), supports this procedure. Memorandum for Heads of Executive Depart-
ments and Agencies from David A. Stockman, Director, Executive Office of the President, OMB,
M-81-9, June 13, 1981.
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not include using legislators' recollections. 274 Legislative intent is de-
termined from legislation itself and from written materials that were
available at the time of passage to influence legislators' votes. To the
extent that legislators wish to guide the explication of their statutory
adoptions, they may create explanatory materials and make them
available to assist their colleagues at the time they vote.
Post-adoption legislative interpretation is not a task for individual
legislators. It is no more appropriate for the OAL to ask a legislator
about the meaning of legislation than it would be for a court to do so.
This practice should be terminated. If legislators wish to state their
views on matters before the OAL, they too should direct their com-
ments to the adopting agency.
V. CONCLUSIONS
After two years of OAL review, a number of conclusions may be
drawn. The OAL review process works well to control the procedural
aspects of rulemaking.275 It is less successful as a control over the sub-
stantive aspects of regulatory adoptions because the process fosters sub-
stitution of judgment and inadequately considers agency expertise.276
With regard to the procedural reforms, elimination of excessive
controls would improve the system. The legislature should recognize a
distinction between factual premises and policy choices, and require
only that the agency include all factual premises in the rulemaking file.
The agencies may ultimately internalize the procedural controls en-
forced by the OAL. If so, there should be fewer and fewer disapprovals
for procedural shortcomings. When the disapproval rate drops to a
small percentage of adoptions, the legislature should consider reversion
to self-control by the agencies and elimination of the procedural review
,process. A "sunset" clause in the laws governing the OAL might pro-
vide a valuable incentive for the agencies to police themselves.
The need for substance control is likely to continue. Agencies
have promulgated fewer regulations since the OAL's birth than
before," indicating that they recognize the current antipathy to regu-
274. C. NurnNo AND R. Dicx,,soN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEoISLATON 425-665
(1978), 3. DAVES, LEOSLATrVE LAW AND PRocEsS 241-62 (1975); 2A C. SANDS, STATUTES AND
STAtfrORY CONSmTUCON (4th ed. 1973).
275. See spra text accompanying notes 168-79.
276. See mpre text accompanying notes 235-45.
277. OAL's reports regularly highlight statistics of the reduction in adopted regulations since
its existence, the diminutions in new proposals, and the percentage of disapproved regulations.
See, eg., 1981-82 OAL A~mAL REPORT 3,6-7. However, the OAL's statistical analyses overstate
that agencys impact. The total decline in regulatory adoptions-50% during the first two years of
we OAL's existence, id at 6--includes diminutions attributable to agency choice as well as to
Vol 1983".231]
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lation. However, a long-term reduction in unnecessary regulation re-
quires bureaucracywide commitment to this goal; such commitment
will not be achieved as easily as compliance with the procedural
changes. Compliance with procedures requires only the time and effort
needed to jump procedural hurdles. In contrast, compliance with sub-
stantive reforms may involve limits on agency programs or policies.
The latter will be far more difficult for officials to accept.
Tension between agency officials who wish to use rulemaking to
accomplish delegated tasks and outsiders who see each regulatory
adoption as a burden is inevitable. A centralized review agency can
serve as an effective buffer between these two perspectives. Continued
broad-based political acceptability requires that the OAL not reflect
one ideological perspective. Rather, the OAL must strike and maintain
a balance that imposes a fair test on agency rulemaking without mak-
ing rulemaking virtually impossible.
It is difficult to determine whether the OAL has thus far reached
such a balance. Some signs suggest that it has. Although the agencies
may not like the OAL's role,278 they have challenged OAL disapprov-
als quite infrequently. Additionally, the legislature has continued to
support the OAL by agreeing to modifications that the OAL has re-
quested in its statutes. Although substitutions of judgment and over-
reaching substantive review have occurred, they have not been
excessive, especially considering that the OAL has had to create the
review system and strike a balance without any prior precedent as a
guide.279
Centralizing review of the substance of regulatory promulgations
in an executive branch agency like the OAL creates some problems.
Nevertheless, it offers significant advantages over legislative branch re-
OAL oversight. Whether agencies are proposing fewer regulations because they could not pass
OAL scrutiny, or because of the general unpopularity of issuing regulations, or--as is most
likely-for a combination of reasons, is undeterminable.
278. The author's personal experience with OAL has been mixed. Although its rejections of
her own agency's proposed regulations have generally been greeted with frustration as well as
derision and occasional anger by staff and Board members, frequently there has been some signifi-
cant basis for the rejection. On other occasions, however, it has been felt with considerable justifi-
cation that the reviewing officials at the OAL had an inadequate understanding of the agency's
functions to assess the proposal, either on substantive ("necessity") grounds or for such procedural
flaws as lak of clarity. This problem relates not to the existence of an OAL in theory, but to the
operation of its reviewing functions, including the nature and experience of its personnel and their
level of respect for and deference to agency officials.
279. The passage of statutes that exempt particular programs and agencies from OAL review
implies some erosion in support for the OAL. See, ag., 1982 Cal. Stat. 978, 1209, 1309. All the
exceptions to OAL authority to date involve regulatory matters of importance to the state budget.
Livingston Interview, rra note 211. Legislative commitment may erode on a broader scale as
the OAL disapproves regulations of concern to individual legislators.
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view.us Legislative review requires the legislature to pay regular atten-
tion to issues of varying importance, a task it is unlikely to under-
take.281
Also, legislative review would be a far more political and therefore
less neutral control device than OAL review. If the legislature desires
to increase its impact on the substance of regulation it should exert
greater control over statutory delegation to agencies. The exertion of
control over agencies by more precise delegation of power would ac-
complish many of the regulatory reformers' objectives with the least
bureaucratic cost.282
To review all legislation authorizing administrative agency activi-
ties would be a massive task unlikely to engage the attention of the
populace or the media. Therefore, it seems unlikely that the legislature
will take such action.283 If the legislature will not itself enforce regula-
tory controls, the executive branch is the only viable option - except,
of course, a return to the formerly-accepted model in which rulemaking
was subject only to judicial review.284 Yet the OAL's tremendous
power over all California regulation gives one pause: the amount of
influence exerted by one fairly independent agency is troublesome.
Any steps to assure the'review agency's accountability, however, will
subject the review process to an increased infusion of political pres-
sure.28 5 Such political pressure is undesirable; the OAL's long-term
280. The legislative veto is one example of such review.
281. Hamilton, supra note 95, at 1327; see generatly Bruff and Gellhom, supra note 16, at
1370-71. The Cizada decision, see supra note 16, strongly suggests that legislative review by
means of the legislative veto could be enacted in California only by constitutional amendment.
The California Constitution, however, is amended frequently, in contrast to the United States
Constitution.
282. See ADmnmsrxrmVE RuLadAXUo, suipra note 53, at 8 (California regulatory reform
treats "symptoms rather than causes" because it does not affect broad delegations of legislative
power); Bliss, supra note 2, at 623; Fuchs, mnra note 201, at 118-19, M. HERANDFZ, supra note 3,
at 13; Moakley, Forewrd, S)jwpodsm on Administrative Law, 16 NEw ENG. L. REV. 645, 655-56
(1981); Rosenberg supra note 2, at 212 n.84, 216. But see McGowan, supra note 37, at 683.
283. § 11349.7(f) (West 1980). ALB. 1111 allows the OAL to recommend programmatic
changes of this type. The legislature has so far ignored OAL's recommendations in this area.
Livingston Interview, apra note 72. The Chaaa case, see spra note 16, eliminating use of the
legislative veto by the United States Congress, will force that body to review several hundred
statutes and to set standards in future legislation that accomplish its purpose.
284. Personally, the author prefers no centralized review of the substance of regulatory adop-
tions. The political climate today, however, demands some nonjudicial review of agency action.
If there must be such review, executive branch review is preferable to legislative branch review.
285. See xpiora text accompanying notes 247-52.
See DeMuth, mspra note 4, at 25; Morrison, Panel I, "Managing the Regulatory Process,"
Pieedings of the National Conference on Federa Redaton: Roads to Rorom, 32 AD. L REV.
266, 269-70.
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survival as an institution demands that it serve reform rather than
programmatic goals.
28 6
Is California's plan a good model for other states and the federal
government? California has considerably slowed the growth of regula-
tion and has forced a review of all existing regulation. Each jurisdic-
tion's unique governmental structure must be considered in deciding
whether, and where, to centralize substance control. Centralized con-
trol over the legal framework of regulatory promulgations - the au-
thority review - may already exist; however, control over the
judgmental decisions of the agencies is the most difficult issue. If a
substantive review is to be reasonably neutral, rather than political, it
must be placed within the governmental structure so that neutrality will
be fostered. Whatever course is taken, it is important to ensure that the
cure is not excessive regulation of the regulatory process. The review
function should be kept efficient and the review agency lean.
If a centralized review will adversely impact the ability of any por-
tion of the citizenry to influence the regulatory process, it should be
reformulated. Alternatively, protections such as funding mechanisms
should be created to moderate its impact. Any power shift of the mag-
nitude involved in establishing a central review authority is likely to
affect both actial and perceived access to decisionmaking processes. If
review based on neutral principles set forth by the legislature is to be
achieved, it is important to ensure that the power redistribution itself is
neutral. No review plan will be theoretically sound, nor will it long
survive political scrutiny, if it is perceived as a tool to impose any lim-
ited philosophy of regulation.
The Governor's e sting power to reverse OAL disapprovals evokes lobbyist pressures. See
Letter of Feb. 19, 1982, from Win. G. Holliman, counsel for the California Forest Protective
Ass'n, to Governor Brown. (Re: appeal of Department of Forestry).
286. One modification might help minimize the political commitment of OAL. The Gover-
nor's appointees to run the agency must be confirmed by a majority of the state Senate; thus, they
need only be politically acceptable to a majority of one house. Requiring more widespread ap-
proval--for example by requiring confirmation by a two-thirds vote of both houses of the Legisla-
ture-would assure consensus about OAL's leaders. Because broad-based support would be
needed for confirmation, persons with strong ideological views of regulation would not attain
leadership positions in OAL.
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